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THE PAPER CHASE:
SECURITIZATION, FORECLOSURE, AND THE
UNCERTAINTY OF MORTGAGE TITLE
ADAM J. LEVITIN†
ABSTRACT
The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important
as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and
uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13
trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a
foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the
proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions
implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a toobig-to-fail problem for the courts.
The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems
for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights.
Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through
the “public demonstration” regimes of UCC Article 3 and land
recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when
mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted
to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages.
To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative
“contracting” regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a
private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of
securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the
expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage
enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at
the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent
only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm,
however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded
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mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as
a whole.
This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems
through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage
recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a
system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential
cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by
clarifying property rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2007, an estimated seven-million or more homes have been
1
sold in foreclosure or distressed sales, a loss in homeownership
unparalleled in American history. The impact of these foreclosures on
households, communities, and the macroeconomy is widely
2
recognized. The foreclosure crisis, however, raises equally weighty
legal issues. The foreclosure crisis is forcing a reexamination of the
nineteenth-century commercial- and real-property-law systems that
continue to undergird critical sectors of the U.S. economy in the
twenty-first century. This reexamination is occurring in the shadow of
a too-big-to-fail problem, because a court’s decision to uphold wellestablished law could trigger a financial crisis.
Problems in the foreclosure process have been apparent since the
3
start of the foreclosure crisis, but the issue burst onto the national
scene in the fall of 2010 with the emergence of the “robosigning”
scandal involving banks’ use of fraudulent affidavits to establish
4
standing to foreclose. Then, in January 2011, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court sent shockwaves through the real-estate- and
commercial-law world by issuing a unanimous ruling in U.S. Bank
1. I arrived at the seven-million figure by adding industry extrapolations and metrics from
July 2007–June 2013 (6.5 million foreclosure sales completed), see Industry Extrapolations and
Metrics (June 2013), HOPE NOW 5 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.hopenow.com/industrydata/2013-06-04-HopeNow.Ful_%20Report_(June).DRAFT.pdf, and my own estimate of
foreclosure sales from January–June 2007 and July–December 2013 (more than 0.5 million
foreclosure sales completed).
2. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT
OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 5–6 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT52671/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT52671.pdf
(detailing
the effect of foreclosures on neighboring property values, educational and religious institutions,
foreclosing banks, and the economy as a whole); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY,
THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 124
(2011) (partially attributing the national economic woes of early 2009 to skyrocketing
foreclosures); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 402–10
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (documenting
the impact of the foreclosure crisis on individual homeowners, housing markets, and financial
institutions); DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND
THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 133–66 (2009) (examining the costs of
high-risk mortgage lending for borrowers, lenders, investors, neighborhoods, cities, renters, and
the national and international economies).
3. See Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2007, at C1 (reporting on a 2007 federal judicial decision that “rais[ed] questions about the legal
standing of investors in mortgage securities pools”).
4. See Gretchen Morgenson, Banks’ Flawed Paperwork Throws Some Foreclosures into
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A1 (noting banks’ use of “dubiously prepared” affidavits).
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National Ass’n v. Ibanez. Ibanez held that a pair of foreclosure sales
was invalid because the foreclosing banks were not the mortgagees of
6
record at the time of the foreclosure sale.
Ibanez was soon followed by two related decisions from the
7
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez and
8
Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n. Bevilacqua held that the
purchaser at an invalid nonjudicial foreclosure sale did not have title
9
to the property, while Eaton held that a foreclosure sale was invalid
because the foreclosing bank did not hold the promissory note at the
10
time of the sale.
A generation ago, none of these opinions would have been
controversial. They would have been viewed as straightforward
applications of well-established commercial and real-property law: a
party cannot foreclose on a mortgage unless it is the mortgagee (or its
11
agent); a mortgage can be enforced only by a person who can
12
enforce the underlying debt; a mortgage is but incidental to the

5. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). For some discussion of
the upheaval that Ibanez caused or was thought likely to cause, see, for example, Gretchen
Morgenson, Massachusetts Ruling on Foreclosures Is a Warning to Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2011, at B1 (noting that Ibanez “open[ed] the door to other foreclosure do-overs” in
Massachusetts); Chad Bray, Massachusetts High Court Ruling Focuses on Foreclosure
Paperwork, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011, 5:48 P.M.), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/07/
massachusetts-high-court-ruling-focuses-on-foreclosure-paperwork (describing Ibanez as a
decision that “spooked bank investors”); Felix Salmon, The Ibanez Case and Housing-Market
Catastrophe Risk, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/01/07/theibanez-case-and-housing-market-catastrophe-risk (predicting a flood of “legal craziness”); Rich
Vetstein, Apocalypse Now? Will the Massachusetts Ibanez Case Unravel Widespread
Irregularities in the Residential Securitized Mortgage Market?, MASS. REAL ESTATE L. BLOG
(Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.massrealestatelawblog.com/2011/01/08/apocalypse-now-will-themassachusetts-ibanez-case-unravel-widespread-irregularities-in-the-residential-securitizedmortgage-market (anticipating that “[o]ther courts across the country will likely be influenced
by the ruling”).
6. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 55. For commentary on Ibanez, see generally Recent Case, U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 827 (2012).
7. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011).
8. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012).
9. Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 898.
10. Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1134.
11. See, e.g., New England Sav. Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp., 680 A.2d 301, 309–10
(Conn. 1996) (holding that the mere holder of a promissory note, if not the owner of the
underlying debt, cannot exercise the equitable power of foreclosure).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(c) (1997) (“A mortgage may be
enforced only by, or in [sic] behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the
mortgage secures.”); id. § 5.4 cmt. e (“Mortgage[s] may not be enforced except by a person
having the right to enforce the obligation or one acting on behalf of such a person. As
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13

promissory note; and one cannot generally convey better title than
14
one has.
These cases did not arise because of prior uncertainty about the
law, but because a too-big-to-fail industry—the housing-finance
industry—found the prior law inconvenient and both changed and
disregarded it, banking on its too-big-to-fail status to guarantee
favorable legal outcomes. The confusion wrought by the conflict
between housing-finance industry practice and well-established law
made resolution of such issues so pressing that the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court took these three cases on expedited, direct
appeal from the trial court, and the Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) felt compelled to issue a
15
special report on the application of the UCC to mortgage notes.
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s rulings upheld
well-established legal principles, the Court was also deeply cognizant
that its rulings risked clouding title across Massachusetts and
departed from its usual practice by making its ruling in Eaton apply
16
only prospectively to future foreclosures.
mentioned, in general a mortgage is unenforceable if it is held by one who has no right to
enforce the secured obligation.” (emphasis omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 275 (1873) (“All the authorities
agree that the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an accessory.”).
14. BRUCE A. MARKELL, JOHN DOLAN & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CORE CONCEPTS IN
COMMERCIAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 1 (2004) (discussing nemo dat quod non
habet as the foundational principle of commercial law). The UCC is replete with provisions that
allow a good-faith purchaser to take better title than the seller had, but these are distinct
situational exceptions to the nemo dat rule. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2011) (protecting goodfaith purchasers of goods); id. § 3-203(b) (vesting in transferees “any right of the transferor to
enforce the instrument, including any right as a holder in due course”); id. § 7-504(a) (allowing
transferees to retain title and rights that a transferor purported to convey in cases in which a
document has been delivered but not duly negotiated); id. § 8-302(a) (entitling purchasers of
even uncertificated securities to “all rights in the security that the transferor had or had power
to transfer”); id. §§ 9-320(a)–(b) (enabling buyers of goods to take the goods free of security
interests in most circumstances). Similarly, there are exceptions to nemo dat in property law.
For example, in the four states that still recognize the fee tail—Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—it is possible for someone with an entailed estate to convey
the estate in fee simple.
15. See generally PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE,
REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO
MORTGAGE NOTES (2011), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/PEB%20Report%20-%20
November%202011.pdf. The Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC is a joint committee of
the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission that curates the UCC, issuing
reports regarding what it believes are the proper legal interpretations of the UCC when
particular controversies arise, as well as drafting occasional amendments to the UCC.
16. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1132–33 (Mass. 2012).
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The Massachusetts trilogy is but the most prominent and
comprehensive group of a growing number of state and federal
17
rulings dealing with standing to foreclose. There have been nearly
three thousand reported opinions dealing with this issue in some way
18
over the past five years. Standing doctrine differs between federal
17. See, e.g., In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 626 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (sustaining an objection to
proof of a claim when the plaintiff could not prove an enforceable right to the note under state
law); In re Tarantola, No. 4:09-bk-09703-EWH, 2010 WL 3022038, at *6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July
29, 2010) (denying a motion for relief from a stay for a lack of real interest in the property when
the plaintiff could not prove the valid assignment of the note); In re Canellas, No. 6:09-bk12240-ABB, 2010 WL 571808, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) (finding no evidence of a
proper assignment of the mortgage nor the note to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure); In
re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 405 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (denying a motion for relief from a stay
for a lack of real interest in the property when the plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of
the note); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 370 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (holding that the servicer
for the holder of the note, who had no beneficial interest in the note, was not the real party of
interest and was not entitled to relief from a stay); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 765 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2008) (holding that a noteholder plaintiff must join the owner of the note, the real party in
interest, before it could seek relief from a stay), rev’d, 438 B.R. 661 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010); In
re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259, 268 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (holding that a putative mortgagee lacked
standing for failing to provide proof of a valid assignment of the mortgage); Glaski v. Bank of
Am., 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 452 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “borrowers have standing to
challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party
beneficiary of, the assignment agreement”); U.S. Bank v. Coley, No. CV076001426, 2011 WL
2734603, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (dismissing a foreclosure complaint for lack of
standing because the mortgage assignment was four months subsequent to the foreclosure suit’s
initiation); Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that the foreclosure must be vacated when the bank “did not yet own the indebtedness that it
sought to foreclose”); Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 252 (Nev. 2012)
(requiring the party seeking to foreclose to demonstrate that it was both the holder of the
promissory note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust); Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Erobobo, No. 31648/2009, 2013 WL 1831799, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (denying a motion for
summary judgment in a foreclosure because the assignment of the note and mortgage were void
for not complying with the pooling and servicing agreement (PSA)); Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l
Ass’n v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 WL 625560, at *9–10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009) (dismissing
a foreclosure action for a lack of standing because the putative mortgagee could not prove it
owned the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v.
Byrams, 275 P.3d 129, 133 (Okla. 2012) (reversing and remanding summary judgment for the
foreclosure plaintiff because standing did not exist at the time an action was instituted); Niday v.
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 1169 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a deed-of-trust
beneficiary who uses the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS) cannot
undertake a nonjudicial foreclosure); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1096 (Vt.
2011) (upholding the denial of standing to foreclose because the bank could not demonstrate
that it was the holder of the note at the time the foreclosure action was initiated). For citations
to other cases addressing the issue of standing in foreclosure actions, see supra notes 5–8 and
accompanying text and infra notes 22, 34, 265 and accompanying text. A sampling of leading
cases are also collected in the Appendix.
18. A search on November 1, 2013, of the Lexis State & Federal Cases database lists for
“(foreclosure w/s standing) AND (mortgage or “deed of trust” or “trust deed”)” yields 2,999
cases since 2007. An identical search in the Westlaw ALLCASES database yields 2,781
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and state courts, but there is broad agreement among courts that
some sort of standing or similar status is necessary for both judicial
19
and nonjudicial foreclosure, just as it is for any sort of debt20
collection action. There is also broad agreement that the party
decisions since 2007. A search for the same terms in the previous seven-year period yields only
297 cases on Lexis and 234 cases on Westlaw. This search is both over- and underinclusive, but it
is nonetheless illustrative.
19. See Dale Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of
the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement To Enforce the Note, 66 ARK. L. REV. 21, 23
(2013) (“While plenty of uncertainty existed, one concept clearly emerged from litigation during
the 2008–2012 period: in order to foreclose a mortgage by judicial action, one had to have the
right to enforce the debt that the mortgage secured. It is hard to imagine how this notion could
be controversial.”). Some states permit only judicial foreclosures. Others allow for either
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure, whereas yet others have solely nonjudicial foreclosure
procedures. See generally MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, JUDICIAL VERSUS NON-JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE, available at http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/
JudicialVersusNon-JudicialForeclosure.pdf.
20. The standing issue has also arisen in the context of credit cards. See, e.g., B-Line, LLC
v. Wingerter, 594 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing sanctions against the purchaser of an
undocumented credit-card-debt claim in bankruptcy); Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., 285
F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying a class in a suit against a debt collector for alleged Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) violations regarding credit-card-debt collection); Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs.,
757 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss in a suit against a debt
collector for alleged FDCPA and RICO violations regarding credit-card-debt collection);
LVNV Funding LLC v. Guest, 953 N.Y.S.2d 550 (City Ct. 2012) (sanctioning a plaintiff’s
counsel in a debt collection lawsuit for failing to provide sufficient documentation to establish
standing); Midland Funding LLC v. Wallace, 946 N.Y.S.2d 67 (City Ct. 2012) (same); MBNA
Am. Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 841 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Civ. Ct. 2007) (dismissing the bank’s motion to
affirm an arbitration award for, among other things, failure to provide a copy of the actual retail
credit contract); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Sued over Credit Card Debt Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2013, at B1 (discussing California’s suit against JPMorgan for credit-card-debtcollection issues); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Problems Riddle Moves To Collect Credit Card
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at A1 (“Lenders . . . are churning out lawsuits without regard
for accuracy, and improperly collecting debts from consumers.”); Jeff Horwitz, ‘Robo’ Credit
Card Suits Menace Banks, AM. BANKER (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:16 A.M.), http://www.
americanbanker.com/issues/177_20/robosigning-credit-card-suits-1046175-1.html (“If banks
prove unsuccessful in defending themselves from claims that their records are shoddy, they run
the risk of inviting a new regulatory crackdown and legal battles over the validity of claims
involving tens of billions of dollars in unsecured debt.”). Some state and local governments have
adopted their own chain-of-title requirements for debt collection. See Daniel J. Langin,
Introducing Certainty to Debt Buying: Account Chain of Title Verification for Debt 3 (Jan. 5,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/debtcollecttech
workshop/00027-60064.pdf.
Credit-card and other consumer loans present somewhat different issues than
mortgages regarding chain of title, not least because unsecured loans only have a promissory
note or other credit agreement, not a security instrument. As a result, there will not be
confusion regarding which title system applies, only questions of what is sufficient proof to show
standing and prove a debt. Even in these regards, credit-card debt differs from mortgages, as it
is much less formal. Whereas a mortgage will usually involve an in-person closing and a single
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bringing the foreclosure action or sale must have standing at the time
the litigation or sale process is commenced. There is far less
agreement, however, about what determines who has standing to
21
bring the foreclosure.
Standing or similar doctrines require the party pursuing a
foreclosure to have a legally cognizable interest in the mortgage. The
modern mortgage market is financed largely through securitization, a
financing method that involves multiple bulk transfers of mortgages.
If loans have not been successfully transferred to the party seeking to
foreclose, then that party has no privity with the loan—and therefore
lacks standing to foreclose. Courts, however, cannot agree even on
what law governs transfers or determines ownership of mortgages,
22
which creates confusion over standing. This confusion over standing
thus stems from confusion about what is required to transfer a
mortgage loan. Are mortgage loans transferred by negotiation—
meaning indorsement and physical delivery of the promissory note—
or by sale contract, or by recordation in land records? Can mortgages
extension of credit, there is unlikely to be anyone with true personal knowledge of credit-card
debt, which is applied for remotely, underwritten and repeatedly authorized, cleared, and
settled through automated systems. Likewise, the small size of credit-card debt may make it
uneconomical to take greater care documenting chains of title. For divergent views on what is
sufficient proof of indebtedness in the credit-card context, compare Manuel Newburger, Should
Sellers of Debt Warrant the Accuracy of Data They Provide?, DBA MAG., Spring 2013, at 16, 42
(arguing that debt buyers are entitled to rely on warranties), with Dalié Jiménez, Illegality in the
Sale and Collection of Consumer Debts 25 (June 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2250784 (advancing the opposite argument).
21. There is also subsidiary disagreement about what documentation suffices as evidence to
show standing. This is where the standing issue in general intersects with robosigning. For
discussion of evidentiary showings in credit-card-debt-collection actions, see supra note 20.
22. This is the case, for example, in Arizona. Compare Varbel v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n,
No. 1 CA-CV 12-0263, 2013 WL 817290, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2013) (holding that a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale does not require the production of the note or its chain of custody),
with In re Tarantola, No. 4:09-bk-09703-EWH, 2010 WL 3022038, at *5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 29,
2010) (denying a motion for relief from a stay for a lack of real interest in the property when the
plaintiff could not prove the valid assignment of the note). It is also the case in Michigan.
Compare Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that a foreclosure must be vacated when the bank “did not yet own the indebtedness that it
sought to foreclose”), with Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183, 183 (Mich.
2011) (holding that MERS had standing to foreclose nonjudicially). Oregon, as compared to
Michigan and Arizona, does not allow MERS standing to foreclose nonjudicially. See Niday v.
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 1169 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (determining that a deed-of-trust
beneficiary who used MERS could not undertake a nonjudicial foreclosure). Washington also
does not give MERS standing to foreclose nonjudicially. See Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc.,
285 P.3d 34, 36–37 (Wash. 2012) (holding that MERS could not utilize the Washington
nonjudicial foreclosure procedure because it was not the lawful beneficiary of a deed of trust
because it does not hold the note).
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be transferred separately from promissory notes? What is the effect
of unrecorded mortgage transfers? It is necessary to determine how
mortgage loans are transferred in order to verify who has title to the
23
mortgage, meaning here the right to enforce it.
Understanding the emergence of the mortgage-title-system
problem and how it might be fixed requires spelunking into some of
the hoariest and most technical minutiae of commercial and realproperty law. These byzantine rules serve as the legal infrastructure
for critical parts of the economy. A $13 trillion residential mortgage
24
market depends directly on clarity of mortgage title, but the
implications of mortgage-title-system problems are further reaching.
At stake is not only the integrity of the legal system and its insistence
on the rule of law when dealing with economically vulnerable and
25
often unrepresented defendants, but also potentially ruinous liability
for the nation’s largest financial institutions. Also at stake is clarity of
title to a large part of the real property in the United States, because
mortgage-title-system problems implicate the alienability of real
property itself. Clouded mortgage title poses a systemic risk to the
economy because clarity of property title is a fundamental sine qua
26
non of modern economies. As the bursting of the housing bubble has
27
shown, housing markets are uniquely linked to the macroeconomy.
23. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S384–85
(2002) (describing different types of property-rights verification regimes).
24. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE Z.1, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE
SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS FIRST QUARTER 2013, tbl.L.216, l. 1
(2013).
25. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602,
07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950,
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007).
26. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6–8, 46–58 (2000) (arguing that the
success of Western capitalism depends on the ability of individuals to leverage clear legal title as
capital); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1395 (2001)
(arguing that institutional differences affecting the protection of property rights account for
some of the differences in per capita income among former European colonies); Daron
Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 984 (2005)
(finding that property-rights institutions are key determinants of economic growth); J. Bradford
DeLong & Andrei Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial
Revolution, 36 J.L. & ECON. 671, 692–93 (1993) (finding a negative correlation between
absolutist regimes with insecure property rights and city growth); Simon Johnson, John
McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335,
1352–53 (2002) (finding that private-sector investment is constrained by a perception of weak
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The mortgage title issue is narrowly a question about the transfer
of mortgages loans, not the transfer of real estate. There is no real
question today about how to transfer Blackacre. The conveyance of
present possessory estates in real property is a matter of state realproperty law. Conveyance procedures vary by state, but these
procedures are not in doubt. Similarly, there is no question about how
to mortgage real property. Instead, the issue is one of subsequent
transfers of mortgages.
Nonetheless, the mortgage chain of title does affect the ability to
transfer clear title to real property. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court’s Bevilacqua decision illustrates a concept familiar to a
generation of property-law students: an invalid foreclosure sale is
28
ineffective to pass title. If the seller is not the person entitled to
foreclose, the foreclosure sale is no different from a sale of the
Brooklyn Bridge. Accordingly, the foreclosure-sale purchaser has no
ability to transfer title to the property, no matter her equities, because
29
she lacks title, just like the hapless buyer of the Brooklyn Bridge.
property rights, even when financing is available). See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16 (1973) (noting that vulnerable
property rights result in underinvestment); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (same).
27. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Why Housing?, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
5, 19–20 (2013) (identifying three transmission channels between housing and the
macroeconomy). The risk is through both clouded title itself and resulting litigation liability for
financial institutions. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:
EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 65 (2010), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.
edu/archive/cop/20110402010313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-111610-report.pdf.
28. See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 898 (Mass. 2011). The case of Rockafellor
v. Gray, 191 N.W. 107 (Iowa 1922) (taking back a property sold at an invalid foreclosure sale
after several subsequent transfers), is included in the leading property-law textbook. See JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (1st ed. 1981).
29. Judicial foreclosures are generally difficult to challenge postsale even if there was no
authority to foreclose because of finality doctrines, see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 632 (5th ed. 2007), and sometimes specific statutory
provisions, see, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1509 (West 2011) (limiting the remedy to a
postsale challenge to the proceeds of the sale, rather than the return of the property); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.45 (West 2004) (providing that the reversal of a foreclosure-sale
judgment does not affect the title of the purchaser, but instead requires restitution by the
foreclosing creditor of the former homeowner). But see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2003 (McKinney 2012)
(allowing a sale to be set aside for up to a year if a substantial right of the debtor was prejudiced
by a defect in sale procedure). In nonjudicial-foreclosure states, however, finality doctrines do
not apply, and a postsale challenge is generally possible. See Elizabeth Renuart, Toward a More
Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States, 24
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 579–80 (2012). Some states impose statutes of limitations for
postsale challenges. See id. at 583 n.95. Moreover, it is not clear whether these limits would
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This means that there are potentially questions about title to many of
the millions of properties that have gone through foreclosure sales
during the past five years.
The mortgage-title-system problem may reach even farther,
extending beyond properties that have gone through foreclosure. A
mortgage lien is a contingent form of ownership. If a property is
mortgaged, it is difficult to sell unless the mortgage lien is released.
Absent release of the lien, the buyer takes the property subject to the
mortgage lien, even though the associated debt remains owed by the
seller: liens follow property, while debts remain with obligors.
Therefore if the seller defaults on the debt, the mortgagee may
foreclose on the mortgage and force the sale of the property now
owned by the buyer. The question about who has the lien on
Blackacre can morph into the question of who owns Blackacre.
Absent clarity about who is the mortgagee, title to Blackacre is not
marketable. Moreover, unless title to land is clear, it can affect other
30
property interests, such as leaseholds, easements, and boundaries.
Therefore, problems in determining who is a mortgagee can affect
title on far more than foreclosure properties. Confusion over
mortgage transfer methods and thus over rights in mortgages has
potentially far-reaching consequences.
This Article examines the legal and market developments that
have befouled the law of mortgage title. It argues that the current
confusion in the law is, at its core, the result of competing mortgage
title systems. This is a novel conceptualization of the problem driving
foreclosure-standing litigation, but, once the problem is understood in
this manner, a solution—reconciliation of title systems—is readily
apparent.
Both land title systems and promissory note title systems purport
to cover mortgage title. Article 3 of the UCC provides a little31
remarked title system for promissory notes. Local land records
provide a title system for land and encumbrances upon it, such as
mortgages. Yet because of the common-law doctrine that “the
mortgage follows the note,” the UCC Article 3 system has also had
apply if the seller had no right to conduct a sale, as opposed to challenges relating to sale
procedures.
30. See David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain
of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 366–68 (2012) (discussing the
impact of unclear title on boundary disputes).
31. For a discussion of the Article 3 provisions that establish this title system for
promissory notes, see infra Part I.A.3.
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the potential to serve as a mortgage title system when a note is
secured by a mortgage.
There was always a latent tension between these public-law
mortgage title systems, but it was of little consequence until the late
twentieth century because mortgages were rarely transferred, and
mortgages were seldom separated from notes. The formalities of both
systems were clear and followed, and as a result, there was seldom a
discrepancy between them. And even if discrepancies existed
between the title systems, they were rarely of consequence. Title was
seldom challenged because foreclosures were rare, and default
judgments and isolated problems usually could be settled quietly.
The long-dormant tension between these systems became a
problem as the mortgage finance market developed from balancesheet lending to securitization. Securitization transactions require
multiple bulk transfers of mortgages in order to achieve various credit
ratings, bankruptcy, tax, accounting, and bank-regulatory-capital
benefits. Absent clear documentation of these transfers, the various
transactional benefits are in doubt, which would undermine the
economic viability of securitization. Title-and-transfer system clarity
is essential for securitization.
Both UCC Article 3 and land records provide a high degree of
title clarity. Despite the potential tension between them, these
systems have fundamental similarities. Both are property rights
verification systems that operate through “public demonstration.”
Both systems require compliance with demonstrative legal formalities
to achieve property rights. Compliance provides the evidentiary
certainty of the property rights. Both systems are examples of the
“paperization principle,” a legal evolution aimed at reducing fraud,
32
uncertainty, and adjudication costs. Thus, obtaining property rights
under these public demonstration regimes has up-front costs due to
formalities, but compliance with the formalities ensures a high degree
of security in the property rights, both vis-à-vis other competing
claimants to the property rights and as to the ability to enforce the
mortgage property rights. These benefits accrue, however, only to
securitization investors; they have no intrinsic value to the sell-side of
the securitization industry, which see them as transaction costs to be
eliminated.

32. See Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper Rights Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 476–77 (1975).
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Accordingly, the sell-side developed alternative mortgage titleand-transfer systems that dispensed with demonstrative public
formalities in favor of private, bilateral contracting. Thus, a private
electronic mortgage registry—the Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS)—was created, and UCC Article 9 was revised
to operate as a system for the sale of notes and mortgages. Bilateral
“contracting” regimes reduced the transaction costs in mortgage
transfers and hence in mortgage securitizations by dispensing with
demonstrative legal formalities. These up-front costs savings,
however, came at the expense of certainty in property rights vis-à-vis
other competing claimants and a reduced ability to enforce the
property rights. In other words, the mortgage transfer regime change
shifted costs from deal formation to deal enforcement. Costs were
thus shifted from the financial institutions that created securitizations
to securitization investors, because the investors could not observe
and price this risk shift because deal documents remained unchanged.
The cost shift only became apparent with the rise of foreclosures and
foreclosure litigation in 2007.
Even now, securitization investors cannot gauge the impact of
the risk shift in terms of their loss-given-default on a mortgage, which
33
is a factor preventing the resurrection of the securitization market.
Continued legal confusion about mortgage transfers frustrates deal
formation in the housing-finance market, which weighs down the
economy overall. Thus, resolving the legal questions about mortgage
transfer is critical for restarting the housing-finance market.
It is important to emphasize that the question of which system
governs mortgage transfers and title is distinct from compliance.
Confusion over which system governs can frustrate compliance, but
compliance problems can exist even with legal clarity, and it is the
specter of widespread compliance problems that directly pose the
too-big-to-fail concern. Although this Article focuses on the systems
question, in many reported cases it appears as if there has been

33. There have been only a handful of private-label residential-mortgage securitization
deals since 2008. See Al Yoon, Deal May Signal Thaw in Mortgage Securities, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
20, 2013, 6:47 P.M.), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324373204578372833475791
270.html. In contrast, the private-label commercial-mortgage securitization market has made a
much more vigorous rebound. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real
Estate Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 112–13 (2013).
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compliance with, at best, one, and often none, of the competing title34
and-transfer systems.
It is also important to emphasize what is and what is not at issue
in challenges to foreclosure standing. Foreclosure standing litigation
does not directly relate to the issue of whether the homeowner is in
35
default on the mortgage or even indebted and to what amount. The
mortgage-title-system issue does not generally go to the question of
the validity of the mortgage loan or its generic enforceability.
Problems with mortgage title do not mean that a loan is not
outstanding or that it is not in default. Instead, the mortgage title
issue is about the specific question of who has the right to enforce the
mortgage and the consequences of improper foreclosures.
Insisting that foreclosures be carried out only by parties with
standing may appear to be a procedural nicety that has little to do
36
with moral rights or economic reality. Such a view fundamentally
misunderstands the mortgage contract. The mortgage contract is not
simply an agreement that the home may be sold upon a default on the
loan. Instead, it is an agreement that if the homeowner defaults on
the loan, the mortgagee may sell the property pursuant to the requisite
legal procedure. A mortgage loan involves a bundle of rights,
including procedural rights. These procedural rights are not merely
notional; they are explicitly priced by the market. Mortgage finance
availability and pricing is statistically correlated with variations in
37
procedural protections for borrowers. Retroactively liberalizing the
34. See, e.g., In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding no evidence of a
proper assignment of the mortgage nor the note to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure);
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615, 620 (App. Div. 2009) (finding no
evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure);
HSBC Bank U.S.A. Nat’l Ass’n v. Miller, 889 N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that a
mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing to foreclose because the mortgagee did not hold the
promissory note at the time the complaint was filed).
35. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596, 602 (Okla. 2012) (“[F]or the
homeowners, absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, today’s decision to reverse
the dismissal of the petition and motion to vacate cannot cancel their obligation arising from an
authenticated Note, or insulate them from foreclosure proceedings based on proven
delinquency. This Court’s decision [that the plaintiff lacks standing to foreclose] in no way
releases or exonerates the debt owed by the defendants on this home.”).
36. Tamara Keith & Renee Montaigne, Sorting out the Banks’ Foreclosure Mess, NPR
(Oct. 15, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130582451
(quoting JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon as saying that “for the most part by the time you
get to the end of the process, you know, we’re not evicting people who deserve to stay in the
house”).
37. See Lee J. Alston, Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 445, 456 (1984) (pointing out the consequences of laws preventing the
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rules for mortgage enforcement creates an unearned windfall for
mortgagees. Moreover, enforcement of bargained-for procedural
requirements such as standing gives homeowners leverage to achieve
negotiated solutions to loan defaults, such as a loan modification.
Alternatively, enforcement of the bargained-for procedural leverage
can buy the homeowner time to relocate, enabling a softer landing
with fewer social dislocations and externalities.
At the same time, however, we should recognize the economic
costs from lack of clarity in mortgage title. When it is not clear who
can foreclose, the result is a defaulted loan sitting in limbo. Someone
is still owed money on the loan and is not being paid. If the
homeowner has abandoned the property, the result is deadweight
loss. If the homeowner remains in residence, the result is a substantial
transfer of wealth from the real lender to the homeowner. The
homeowner has functionally secured a rent-free dwelling, but it is
with uncertain tenure and little alienability, as the house is still
encumbered. This situation is bad for both the ultimate economic
lender on the loan and for the economy as a whole, as part of the
housing market is unable to clear. Thus, although the rule of law is
part of the microeconomic bargain, insistence upon it may be less
than optimal from a macroeconomic standpoint.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the traditional
mortgage title-and-transfer systems: UCC Article 3 and land records.
It emphasizes how these systems required demonstrative formalities
of transfer but created high degrees of certainty in the property rights
transferred. Part II explains how the change in mortgage financing
from balance-sheet lending to securitization affected the demands
made on mortgage title-and-transfer systems. Part III examines the
foreclosure of farms); Quinn Curtis, State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the
Subprime, J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 19 (2013), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11146013-9437-9 (“The provisions that make foreclosure easier—nonjudicial process and readily
available deficiency judgments—lead to increased applications and accepted applications in the
subprime market . . . .”); Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise of the
Default Option in Home Mortgage Loans, 36 J.L. & ECON. 115, 126–27 (1993) (noting the lender
response to default rates); Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage
Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 146 (1982) (estimating a 13.87 basis-point increase in interest
rates on new homes as a result of antideficiency laws); Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on
Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177, 180 (2006) (noting
that the availability—and hence, the cost—of mortgages in states with judicial foreclosure
proceedings is greater than in states with nonjudicial foreclosures); Michael H. Schill, An
Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 491 (1991) (arguing that
“the relatively modest costs associated with state mortgagor protection laws do suggest that
mortgagor protections may indeed promote economic efficiency”).
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additional mortgage transfer methods created to facilitate
securitization: MERS and revised UCC Article 9. It suggests that the
securitization sell-side and the securitization buy-side may have had
different understandings of how transfers were to occur in
securitizations, which the sell-side exploited to capture the cost
savings from regime change and increase the volume of its fee-based
business and hence its profits.
Part IV reviews existing reform proposals and considers how
mortgage title systems could be reconciled. It proposes the creation of
a registration system for mortgage notes that would be linked via
unique identifiers to mortgages recorded in the land records.
Registration would create a rebuttable presumption of ownership,
and matching mortgage recordation and note registration would be a
precondition of foreclosure. Linked note-and-mortgage title systems
would preserve borrowers’ interest in keeping the terms of notes
private, resolve questions about foreclosure standing, remove the
potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing
transactions generally by clarifying property rights.
The Article concludes with some observations about the lessons
that the mortgage-title-system confusion holds out for commercial
law more generally and the problem of too-big-to-fail in the courts.
The title-system problem stands as a reminder of the problems that
can arise when certainty of property rights is eroded to reduce
transaction costs and of the toll that too-big-to-fail problems take on
the judicial system.
I. TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE TITLE SYSTEMS
The obligation colloquially referred to as a “mortgage” is usually
embodied in two separate instruments: a promissory note and a
38
security instrument. The promissory note is what creates the debt
obligation, whereas the security instrument is what makes real
property the collateral securing performance on the note. The
security instrument is what enables the remedy of foreclosure—the
forced sale of the collateral property—upon default on the note. The
note is enforceable without the security instrument, as an unsecured

38. The name and operation of the security instrument vary by state, but the differences
are not essential for our purposes. Sometimes the security instrument is called a “mortgage”;
other times, a “deed of trust” or “trust deed.” In some states the mortgage transaction is a twoparty transaction, whereas in other states a three-party escrow arrangement is used.
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debt. The security instrument, however, has little meaning without
the note.
Traditionally, mortgage title and transfer was governed by
Article 3 of the UCC and land recordation systems. UCC Article 3 is
generally thought of as payment-system law, but it is also property law
for certain payment and debt instruments. UCC Article 3 is a titleand-transfer system for notes. Although a few scholars have
39
recognized this feature of Article 3, a further corollary has gone
unremarked: not only is UCC Article 3 a property-law system for
notes, but it is also a property-law system for mortgages. This is
because of the common-law doctrine providing that “the mortgage
follows the note,” meaning that a transfer of the note effectuates a
transfer of the associated security interest. Thus, UCC Article 3 is a
mortgage title-and-transfer system too, despite the word “mortgage”
never appearing in Article 3. This point bears particular emphasis
because UCC Article 3 has never been understood as a mortgage title
system, even though it functions as one.
Mortgages are also understood as conveyances of interests in real
property. Accordingly, both their creation and their transfer are
potentially subject to state law on real-estate conveyance. Moreover,
mortgages and their transfers are typically recorded in land
recordation systems, and it is land records that are typically thought
of as the system of mortgage title.
Yet, once UCC Article 3 is understood to cover not just notes,
but also mortgages, it becomes clear that there have long been two
separate—and possibly conflicting—title systems for mortgages: title
per the UCC Article 3 system might not correspond with title as
evidenced in the land records. In such a case, which system controls?
Can title to the mortgage and note be split? And if so, what are the
enforcement rights that go with each instrument by itself?
This Article argues that both UCC Article 3 and land
recordation systems are what it terms “public demonstration” regimes
for establishing property title, as opposed to what it terms
“contracting” regimes. Public demonstration regimes establish
property title through the use of demonstrative formalities that are
publicly observable. This is akin to establishing title through physical
markers like cattle brands and tags or signs noticing ownership, be
39. See Neil B. Cohen, The Calamitous Law of Notes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 177–81 (2007)
(discussing the obtainment of good “title” to notes). See generally James Steven Rogers,
Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197 (1984).
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they copyright indications or private-property signs on real property.
These demonstrative formalities are potentially cumbersome and
costly, but they engender a high degree of certainty in property rights
because they are more easily verified by third parties.
A contracting regime, in contrast, is a completely private set of
bilateral arrangements for the transfer of property rights. Because it
is a bilateral contracting arrangement, the requirements are whatever
the parties agree to so long as the transfer agreement is sufficient to
40
support a simple contract. Contracting regimes sacrifice the easy
verifiability by third parties in favor of potentially lower transaction
costs for property transfer. To the extent that the property transfer is
unlikely to affect third parties, a contracting regime would seem to
sacrifice relatively little to obtain greater efficiency. Thus, if Somerset
sells Gloucester a cake, there seems relatively little purpose to
requiring public formalities beyond what the parties themselves want
to feel comfortable with the enforceability of their transaction. If
Gloucester is worried Somerset will try to reclaim the cake, he may
insist on greater formalities to the extent they are cost effective, but
the decision is entirely between the contracting parties.
If the transfer implicates third parties’ rights, however, then a
contracting regime may in fact impose negative externalities on the
third party by muddling their rights. A mortgage would seem the
classic case of a transfer that is likely to affect third parties. Not only
are there the third-party obligor on the note and potentially tenants
on the property, but there are also potentially other lienholders,
beneficiaries of servitudes, and taxing authorities that are affected.
Accordingly, it makes sense that traditional mortgage title systems
were public demonstration regimes because public demonstration
regimes helped clarify the legal rights of third parties.
UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems are both types of
public demonstration regimes. Both have their origins in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the case of UCC Article 3,
this means that the use of integrated, formalized writings transferred
through indorsement and physical delivery and enforced via
presentment. In the case of real-estate conveyance, this means the
40. Historically, contracting regimes involved some level of demonstrative formality, such
as the requirement of either seal or consideration. Modern contract law has dispensed with the
seal and reduced consideration to a legal fiction. The Statute of Frauds—another historical
requirement of demonstrative formality—may still apply, potentially imposing some minimal
requirements of demonstrative formalities for a transfer of property by contract to be legally
enforceable.
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recording of conveyances in public records and possibly other
requirements, such as witnesses and notarization.
Establishing clear property title means, at its core, freedom from
competing claims to the property and the ability to fully exercise
dominion over the property. Freedom from claims means that there is
superior title to that of other transferees, such as prior or subsequent
purchasers and lienholders, as well as bankruptcy trustees vested with
41
the powers of hypothetical purchasers and creditors. Freedom from
claims also means superior title to that of transferors and those
subrogated to transferors’ rights, most importantly, again, bankruptcy
42
trustees. Full exercise of dominion means, in the case of a right to
payment such as a mortgage, the ability to successfully enforce the
right to payment. This would include freedom from defenses to
enforcement. The critical common feature of the UCC Article 3 and
land recordation systems as mortgage title systems is that they require
compliance with demonstrative public formalities in order to achieve
a high level of certainty in property rights in mortgages.
A. UCC Article 3
43

1. Scope. UCC Article 3 applies only to negotiable instruments.
For a promissory note to be negotiable under Article 3, it must
comply with specific statutory requirements. The note must be “an
44
unconditional promise . . . to pay a fixed amount of money.” The
45
note must be payable on demand or at a definite time and not
contain additional undertakings by the obligor other than a few that
46
do not concern us here. And finally, the note must be payable to
47
bearer or order when first issued. This final requirement means that
the instrument must contain language along the lines of “payable to

41. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012) (addressing the rights and powers of bankruptcy
trustees).
42. Id. § 541 (defining the property of a bankruptcy estate); id. § 704 (listing the duties of a
trustee in bankruptcy).
43. U.C.C. § 3-102(a) (2011).
44. Id. § 3-104(a); see also id. § 3-106 (defining an unconditional promise). The note may
provide for interest and other charges as well. Id. § 3-104(a).
45. Id. § 3-104(a)(2).
46. Id. § 3-104(a)(3).
47. Id. § 3-104(a)(1).
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the order of [a name]” or “payable to bearer.” If the note simply said,
48
“Payable to John Doe,” it would not be negotiable.
Most mortgage notes purport to be negotiable and are generally
assumed to be so by courts and litigants. Although scholars have
49
questioned whether mortgage notes are in fact negotiable, there is
no question that they are supposed to be negotiable. Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) guidelines restrict Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) insurance to mortgage loans made with
50
negotiable notes. The Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform note, which
51
is used for most mortgage loans, purports to be negotiable. Fannie
and Freddie—the largest purchasers of mortgage loans—will not
purchase mortgages that do not use their uniform note unless the
52
note is negotiable. Until recently, there were no reported decisions
regarding the negotiability of the Fannie/Freddie uniform note or the
53
HUD model note, but the modern mortgage finance market is built
54
upon an assumption of negotiability.

48. Historically, the obligor would only have to pay John Doe, but in most jurisdictions,
choses in action are now freely assignable, even in the face of language to the contrary. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 (1981) (limiting the effect of contractual
prohibition of assignment).
49. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44
UCLA L. REV. 951, 968–73 (1997); Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the
Secondary Mortgage Market, and What To Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 749–57 (2010).
50. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HUD 4155-2, LENDER’S GUIDE TO THE
SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROCESS 6-B-7 (2011), available at http://portal.hud.
gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/administration/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4155.2.
51. Bruce D. Bolander & Mark C. Suchman, Sale and Lien Perfection Under the U.C.C., in
PRACTICING LAW INST., STRUCTURED MORTGAGE AND RECEIVABLES FINANCING 623, 665
(R.S. Dayan ed., 1989).
52. See FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 22–23 (2013),
available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel040913.pdf (noting that a lender selling
a mortgage loan not closed on a uniform instrument warrants that the note constitutes a
negotiable instrument).
53. See e.g., In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 283–84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding a note to
be negotiable and collecting other cases). Although not noted in the opinion, the note in
question was the Fannie/Freddie Multistate Fixed Rate Note for Single Family, Form No. 3200
1/01. Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit A, In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271 (No. 10-bk-12592).
The mortgage was a Fannie/Freddie uniform instrument for Pennsylvania for Single Family,
Form No. 3039 1/01. Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit B, In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271 (No.
10-bk-12592).
54. See Jeffrey P. Naimon, Jacob Thiessen & Jennifer Beall, Assignee Liability in
Residential Mortgage Transactions, 19 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERV. 89A, 89D (2003)
(“Institutions and practices that we take for granted would be far different without the holder in
due course rule, if they could exist at all.”).
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Even if the notes are not formally negotiable, the UCC
contemplates that in appropriate circumstances, such as when
indicated by custom and usage, the notes should still be governed by
55
Article 3. For the purposes of this Article, there is no need to resolve
the question of whether the notes are in fact negotiable. Instead, it is
merely enough to observe that this is yet another point on which
there is a real question about what law applies and how an enormous
market rests on legally uncertain underpinnings. The following
analysis treats the notes as negotiable.
2. UCC Article 3 as a Note Transfer System. UCC Article 3
56
provides a method for transferring negotiable instruments. Transfer
of a negotiable instrument under Article 3 occurs through delivery of
the instrument to the transferee “for the purpose of giving to the
57
person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” Thus,
for negotiable instruments, transfer is about enforcement rights.
Indeed, absent enforcement rights, there is very little value in
possessing a promissory note (negotiable or otherwise); a note that is
“payable to Donald Trump” is of little use to me.
58
A transfer under Article 3 requires delivery. Delivery requires a
59
voluntary transfer of physical possession. Article 3 requires physical
60
movement of paper as part of a note transfer. The logic for this
requirement is discussed in the following Section. Some transfers of
notes are “negotiations,” meaning a transfer of an instrument by
someone other than its maker to someone who then becomes a

55. Official Comment 2 to UCC section 3-104 notes:
[I]t may be appropriate, consistent with the principles stated in Section 1-102(2), for a
court to apply one or more provisions of Article 3 to the writing by analogy, taking
into account the expectations of the parties and the differences between the writing
and an instrument governed by Article 3.
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (2011). UCC Section 1-103(a)(2) explains that among the purposes and
policies of the UCC is “to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.” Accordingly, even if a mortgage note does not fit
the statutory definition of a negotiable instrument, it may still be appropriate to apply Article 3
to the note because such notes are considered negotiable by custom and usage. If the note is not
negotiable and Article 3 is not applied by analogy, then the note would be governed by the
common law of contracts.
56. Id. §§ 3-201, 3-203.
57. Id. § 3-203(a).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 1-201(15).
60. Id. § 3-203(a).
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“holder.” To be a holder, a person must possess an instrument
62
payable to either bearer or to himself. This means that holder status
depends in part on to whom the instrument is payable.
If an instrument is payable to bearer, delivery alone will suffice
63
for a negotiation. If an instrument is payable to (or to the order of)
an identified person, however, then the negotiation requires not just
64
delivery, but also indorsement by the prior holder. An indorsement
is a signature on the instrument or on a piece of paper affixed to the
65
instrument (known as an allonge). If the indorsement identifies a
particular party to whom the instrument is payable, it is called a
66
“special indorsement.” Any other type of indorsement by the holder
67
is called a “blank indorsement.” The indorsement need not have a
blank in it, such as “pay to _____” or “pay to the order of ______.”
Indeed, the indorser’s signature alone constitutes a blank
indorsement. A blank indorsement transforms the instrument into
bearer paper—an instrument that is payable to the bearer—similar to
68
cash. Either way, indorsement gives the transferee all of the
69
transferor’s rights to enforce the instrument.
The standard rule in contract and property law is that transferees
take only those rights that the transferor had—meaning that the
transferee is subject to any claims or defenses that could have been
70
raised against the transferor. Negotiability is a deviation from this
rule, enabling certain transferees to take title superior to that of the
transferors. This special type of transferee is the “holder in due
course,” a holder of an instrument who has taken the instrument in
good faith, for value, and without notice of default or defect in the
71
instrument. A holder in due course is immune from competing
72
73
claims to the instrument, from claims in recoupment, and from
61. Id. § 3-201(a).
62. Id. § 1-201(21)(A).
63. Id. § 3-201(b).
64. Id. § 3-201(b); see id. § 1-201(21)(B) (defining “holder”).
65. Id. § 3-204(a).
66. Id. § 3-205(a).
67. Id. § 3-205(b).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 3-203(b).
70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981); 6A C.J.S.
Assignments § 124 (2004).
71. U.C.C. § 3-302(a).
72. Id. § 3-306.
73. Id. §§ 3-305(a)(3), 3-305(b).
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defenses to enforcement other than infancy, duress, lack of capacity,
74
illegality, fraud in the inducement, and insolvency discharge. Thus,
the holder in due course has particularly secure property rights:
freedom from claims to the instrument and freedom from some
defenses, thereby enabling easier enforcement of the property rights.
The ability of a purchaser of a negotiable note to become a
holder in due course significantly enhances the liquidity and hence
the value of the instrument. Because a holder in due course is
immune from some defenses, counterclaims, and competing claims,
much less diligence is required of a purchaser of a negotiable note.
Holder-in-due-course status is used to shield mortgage investors from
75
assignee liability in the secondary mortgage market, which has
76
encouraged the funding of more aggressive mortgage lending.
3. UCC Article 3 as a Note Title System. UCC Article 3 functions
not only as a transfer system, but also as a title system for negotiable
notes, even though it is seldom conceived of as such. Article 3 is not
expressly a title system. Indeed, the operative concept in Article 3 is
77
not ownership, but enforcement rights. The main rights given by
78
UCC Article 3 are to a “person entitled to enforce” an instrument,
79
not to an “owner.” A person entitled to enforce is: (1) a holder of an
instrument, (2) a nonholder in possession with rights of a holder, or
(3) a person not in possession who is entitled to enforce the
80
instrument pursuant to Article 3’s lost-instrument provisions.
The first category of person entitled to enforce, a holder,
requires physical possession of the instrument, which must be payable

74. Id. §§ 3-305(a)(1)–(2), 3-305(b).
75. See generally Naimon et al., supra note 54.
76. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 2, at 234–35; Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:
Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 503, 507 (2002); Christopher Lewis Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2185, 2233–34 (2007).
77. The terminology of “title” was used in the original 1951 version of Article 3, which is
still in force in New York. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-417 (McKinney 2013) (warranty of “good
title” to transferees and payors).
78. U.C.C. § 3-301.
79. Property law has long recognized that property is a “bundle of rights” that can be
disaggregated, with enforcement rights as but one of the sticks in the bundle. See Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 746 (1917) (“‘[P]roperty’ . . . consists of a complex aggregate of rights (or claims),
privileges, powers, and immunities.”).
80. See U.C.C. § 3-301 (referencing sections 3-309 and 3-418(d)).
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either to the bearer or to the possessor. The second category is a
narrow class of parties subrogated to the rights of a holder, such as an
82
insurer. It too requires possession of the instrument and carries with
it the absolute right to require the transferor to indorse the
83
instrument to the possessor or in blank. The final category, a person
seeking to enforce a lost instrument, obviously does not require
current possession of the instrument. But it does require proving that
the party was otherwise a person entitled to enforce before the
84
instrument was lost —by proving possession upstream in the chain of
85
title—as well as proving the terms of the instrument. Thus,
irrespective of how a party qualifies as a person entitled to enforce, it
is necessary to prove both possession and that the instrument is either
bearer paper or payable to the order of the party seeking
86
enforcement. In other words, enforcement rights are contingent
upon title rights.
To appreciate how Article 3 functions as a title system, it is
necessary to consider a key feature of negotiable instruments: under
the doctrine of merger, the instrument is the reification of the
payment obligation. This means the physical piece of paper is the
87
claim itself, as the duty to pay is merged in the instrument, whereas
81. Id. § 1-201(21). The concept of “person entitled to enforce” is a form of statutory
standing that predates federal standing doctrine. See generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (discussing the
origins of federal standing doctrine). Constitutional and prudential standing may involve
separate analyses. See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (“Even
when a case falls within . . . constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff still may lack standing under . .
. prudential principles . . . .”).
82. See U.C.C. § 3-301 cmt. (“A nonholder in possession of an instrument includes a person
that acquired rights of a holder by subrogation or under Section 3-203(a).”).
83. See id. § 3-203(c) (“[I]f an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does
not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, the transferee has a
specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor . . . .”).
84. See U.C.C. § 3-309(a)(i) (1990). In the 2002 Official Text of Article 3, which has been
adopted in ten states as of 2012, see PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL
CODE, supra note 15, at 2 n.6, the lost-note provision has been expanded to cover parties that
purchased a note from a person entitled to enforce who had lost the instrument, see U.C.C. § 3309(a)(1)(B) (2002).
85. U.C.C. § 3-309(b) (2011). Query how one can determine whether a lost note was in fact
negotiable and whether UCC Article 3 therefore even applies.
86. Or, technically, that the person entitled to enforce that is not a holder has the right to
have the instrument indorsed to be payable to it. See id. § 3-203(c) (“[T]he transferee has a
specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor, but the
negotiation of the instrument does not occur until the indorsement is made.”).
87. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441, 449 (1979); see U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 1 (“An instrument is a reified right to payment.
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with a nonnegotiable instrument, the writing is merely a
memorialization of the contract with no more than an evidentiary
effect.
The merger doctrine’s origins lie in the original function of
negotiable-instrument law—monetizing debt instruments in
88
economies that lacked paper currency. By creating an instrument
that could be taken free of claims and personal defenses, negotiableinstrument law created a private form of paper currency. In so doing,
the merger doctrine transformed intangible contract rights into a
peculiar form of personality.
As atavistic as reification may seem, it can actually enhance
economic activity. Reification turns negotiable instruments into liquid
assets by enabling some level of freedom from claims and defenses
for all holders (not just those in due course), and it encourages
borrowing by eliminating the risk of multiple satisfactions.
Reification enables the terms of the instrument to be determined
by looking at the four corners of the instrument. “My face is my
89
fortune, Sir,” quipped Professor Karl Llewellyn. Indeed, the
statutory definition of negotiable instrument requires an
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain and prohibits additional
90
undertakings. Reification functions like an integration clause,
keeping out parol evidence, thereby eliminating some possible
defenses to enforcement. The result is to reduce diligence demands

The right is represented by the instrument itself.”); id. § 3-310(b) (providing that when a note is
given for an obligation, “the obligation is suspended to the same extent the obligation would be
discharged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the instrument were taken,” and that
if a person entitled to enforce an instrument ceases to have possession of the instrument, “the
obligation may not be enforced to the extent of the amount payable on the instrument”). The
merger doctrine is, of course, a fiction because an action can still be brought on a lost or
destroyed instrument. Id. §§ 3-309, 3-312(b) (permitting enforcement of a lost or destroyed
instrument if the terms of the instrument can be proven). If the debt were truly merged into the
instrument, it would be definitively discharged with the destruction of the instrument.
88. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 182 (explaining that the merger doctrine “is designed for a
day in which pieces of paper that were not money passed in commerce as sort of a quasicurrency”); see also Gilmore, supra note 87, at 448–50 (discussing the origins of the merger
doctrine). National paper currencies are a relatively new invention. The United States lacked a
national paper currency until the 1862 issuance of “Greenbacks” as a Civil War financing
mechanism. See Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67
U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 424–26 (1999). Prior to the adoption of Greenbacks and then national bank
notes during the Civil War, paper currency consisted of private, negotiable bank notes. See id. at
410–13.
89. Karl N. Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instruments, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299 (1944).
90. U.C.C. § 3-104.
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on purchasers of negotiable instruments and to ease enforcement of
the instrument. Instead of having to prove the underlying contract,
the party enforcing the instrument need only show that the
92
instrument has been dishonored. If the party enforcing the
instrument is a holder in due course, enforcement is even easier
93
because personal defenses are cut off. Irrespective of holder-in-duecourse status, however, reification enhances enforcement rights.
Reification also enhances security of property rights from
competing claims. Reification enables title via possession (if the note
94
is payable to the bearer ), and possession clarifies title because there
95
can be only one possessor at a time. Reification also enables transfer
by indorsement. Indorsement creates a chain of title that travels with
the instrument and provides an easy, objective manner for
establishing who has rights to the instrument. The two faces of the
instrument itself will indicate who has rights in it based on the
presence (or absence) of indorsements. Thus, to Llewellyn’s “[m]y
face is my fortune, Sir,” we might add, “and my past is behind me.”
Clarity of title is furthered by the fact that a holder in due course—
requiring, inter alia, indorsement and possession—takes the
96
instrument free of competing claims.
By enhancing freedom from defenses and freedom from claims,
reification increases the liquidity, and hence the value, of negotiable
instruments. The negotiable instrument is thus “a courier without
97
luggage.” Increased liquidity may benefit both creditors and
obligors. Creditors gain an easy-to-enforce, liquid asset. Depending
on market power, obligors might capture some of this benefit, as

91. See Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in the
Wake of Enron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 100 (2007) (observing that negotiable-debt
purchasers “do not have to worry about whether there are defenses to the debt beyond those
involving the legitimacy of the instrument”); see also Edward J. Janger, The Cost of Liquidity
Enhancement: Transparency Cost, Risk Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 46 (2009) (“The core doctrines of liquidity enhancement, freedom
from claims and freedom from defenses . . . facilitate negotiability . . . .”).
92. See U.C.C. § 3-308(b) (“If the validity of signatures is admitted [which is assumed
unless specifically denied] or proved . . . a plaintiff producing the instrument is entitled to
payment if the plaintiff proves entitlement to enforce the instrument . . . unless the defendant
proves a defense or claim in recoupment.”); id. § 3-308 cmt. 2.
93. Id. § 3-305(b).
94. Id. § 3-109(a).
95. Rogers, supra note 39, at 205.
96. U.C.C. § 3-306; see Cohen, supra note 39, at 179–80.
97. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846).
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there could be a discount in lending terms for the use of a negotiable
instrument because of the liquidity benefit to the creditor.
A final, unappreciated benefit of reification is that it protects
debtors from multiple satisfactions. Payment made to any person
98
entitled to enforce discharges the instrument. Historically, the UCC
and the Negotiable Instruments Law before it sometimes required
presentment—an actual demand for payment when the note became
99
due—as part of the enforcement process. The requirement of
presentment, like most UCC terms, was only a default rule, however;
100
it could be altered by agreement. Although presentment is no
longer the default rule for most notes in the jurisdictions that adopted
101
the 1991 revision of UCC Article 3, it is still the default rule in New
102
York. When presentment is required as part of enforcement, the
party to whom presentment is made may require exhibition of the
instrument, identification of the person making presentment, and
evidence of that person’s authority if acting as an agent, as well as a
signed receipt for payment and surrender of the instrument upon full
103
payment.
By embodying the obligation in the instrument, the exchange of
the instrument for final payment is made, and the instrument’s
subsequent destruction or cancellation helps shield against multiple
satisfactions of the debt. Avoidance of multiple satisfactions is so
fundamental to developed economies that it is taken for granted.
Elimination of multiple-satisfaction risk, however, is a major factor
104
separating developed and developing credit economies. In the

98. U.C.C. §§ 3-603(b)–(c).
99. U.C.C. § 3-501 (1951); Negotiable Instruments Law § 145 (1905). The former UCC
section 3-501 is still in force in New York, N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-501 (McKinney 2013), and
South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 36-3-501 (Supp. 2012).
100. U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001); U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1991); see also U.C.C. § 3-502 cmt. 2 (2011)
(“In the great majority of cases presentment and notice of dishonor are waived with respect to
notes.”).
101. See U.C.C. § 3-502(a) (2011) (noting that presentment is not required for notes that are
not payable on demand or at or through a bank, or if the terms of the note do not require
presentment).
102. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-505. Presentment and notice of dishonor may still be waived
contractually under New York law. Id. § 1-102(3). The Freddie Mac Single Family Uniform
Note (including the New York version) contains such a waiver. FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3233:
NEW YORK FIXED RATE NOTE para. 9 (2013), available at http://www.freddiemac.
com/uniform/doc/3233-NewYorkFRNote.doc.
103. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-505; U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(2).
104. See Catherine S.M. Duggan, Credit and Coercion: Indirect Regulation and the
Institutional Foundations of Lending Markets 46–50 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
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absence of legal records that can be relied upon to show that a debt
has been satisfied, creditors will often seek multiple satisfactions of
debt. If a debtor fears multiple satisfaction of the same debt, the
105
debtor will not borrow, thereby chilling economic activity. Making
the physical instrument the avatar of the payment obligation not only
provides a system of tracking functional title in terms of freedom
from claims. It also enables verification of the terms of the obligation
and hence greater ability to enforce as well as provide a mechanism
for verifying the discharge of the obligation.
4. UCC Article 3 as a Mortgage Title-and-Transfer System. UCC
Article 3 says nothing about mortgages associated with notes. Instead,
whether the transfer of the note has any effect on the mortgage is a
question of state common law. In most states there is at least some
statement in case law to the effect that “the mortgage follows the
106
note,” but few states have this as a definitive point of law either in
107
108
case law or statute. In most states, it exists merely as dicta, and in
109
some states there is also law that the “note follows the mortgage.”
Nonetheless, the “mortgage follows the note” principle was
incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of Property, which
provides that “[a] transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also
transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree
110
otherwise.” If the mortgage does indeed follow the note, then
Duke Law Journal) (presenting a game-theoretic model of lending in which the lender pursues
the borrower after payment and empirical evidence of this model).
105. Id. at 175–92.
106. See AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, TRANSFER AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE LOANS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 16–21 (2010), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/asf_white_paper_11_16_10.pdf (detailing
cases and statutory provisions relating to the mortgage-follows-the-note doctrine); see also 55
AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 927 (2009) (“The mortgage follows the debt, in the sense that the
assignment of the note evidencing the debt automatically carries with it the assignment of the
mortgage.”).
107. An important exception is California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2936 (West 2012) (“The
assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the security.”).
108. Likewise, the ongoing validity of the Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. Longan,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271 (1872), is questionable, as it was decided as a matter of general federal
common law, which was disavowed by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). See
Carpenter, 83 U.S. at 277 (“We think the doctrine we have laid down is sustained by reason,
principle, and the greater weight of authority.”).
109. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. McConnell, 305 P.3d 1, 6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (“In
Kansas, it has been the law since 1899 that the note follows the mortgage.”).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(a) (1997). Confusingly, section
5.4(b) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Uniform Commercial Code, a transfer
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Article 3 also functions as a mortgage title-and-transfer system. The
title to the mortgage would track the title to the note, and transfers of
the note would effectuate transfers of the mortgage.
Significantly, Article 3 says nothing about the enforceability of
mortgages. The “mortgage follows the note” concept would seem to
be about ownership rather than physical possession. Thus, although
possession of a note may confer the right to enforce the note, it is not
clear whether it also confers the right to foreclose on the associated
mortgage. As Article 3 does not address the enforceability of
mortgages, mortgage enforceability would presumably be a matter of
nonuniform state law and likely keyed to “ownership” of either the
mortgage or the note, rather than physical possession of the note.
B. Land Recordation Systems
UCC Article 3 is not just a title-and-transfer system for notes,
but also for mortgages. The problem is that it is not clearly an
exclusive title-and-transfer system for mortgages because mortgages
are also governed by real-property law. Real-property law is far from
uniform, so the following discussion is necessarily generalized, but the
basic legal contours of real-property law are clear.
A mortgage is an estate in real property—if the payment
obligation secured by the mortgage is not made, the mortgagee may
sell the property to satisfy the obligation. States are split on whether
the granting of a mortgage is to be understood as creating a present
111
or contingent estate in real property. States that take the former
view are called title-theory states, while states that adopt the latter
112
view are lien-theory states. In a title-theory state, a mortgage (or
deed of trust) is seen as a sale and repurchase arrangement: title to
the land is presently conveyed to the mortgagee or deed-of-trust
trustee and is then reconveyed to the mortgagor upon satisfaction of

of a mortgage also transfers the obligation the mortgage secures unless the parties to the
transfer agree otherwise.” Id. § 5.4(b). Thus, as the Restatement would have it, the mortgage
follows the note, but the note also follows the mortgage. It is not clear how this principle fits
with three-party, deed-of-trust arrangements in which the note goes to the lender, but the trust
deed goes to the deed trustee, effectuating a split of the mortgage and note.
111. See id. § 1.1 (“A mortgage is a conveyance or retention of an interest in real property as
security for performance of an obligation.”); REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3.10 (2013), available
at LexisNexis, 4A-3 Real Estate Financing § 3.10 (listing states by theory adopted).
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (describing the three
types of theories of mortgage law recognized by U.S. courts).
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the debt or sold upon default. In a lien-theory state, a mortgage is a
114
contingent conveyance, triggered only by default on the loan.
Because a mortgage is understood as a conveyance of a present
estate in real property in a title-theory state, it follows that the
granting and transfer of mortgages must comply with the formalities
115
of land conveyance. This may include the requirement of a writing
to comply with the state Statute of Frauds, and other formalities, such
as the signature of the conveyor, the signature of witnesses, and
particular methods of describing the transferred property. Even in
lien-theory states, however, various formalities may still be required
for the granting and transfer of mortgages. Thus, land records are
another type of public demonstration regime for establishing property
rights.
Among the formalities associated with land conveyance is
116
recordation. Every state has a real-property recordation statute.
Recordation of title to real property is not mandatory, as recordation
itself does not establish title to land. Moreover, it is not recordation
that creates the right to foreclose, but the security instrument itself.
Presumably the recordation of a defective security instrument that
did not include a right to foreclose would not create a right to
foreclose upon default. Recordation by itself only establishes
evidence of title and potentially priority of rights vis-à-vis competing
117
claimants to the property.

113. See id. § 4.1 cmt. a(1).
114. See id. § 4.1 cmt. a(2) (“Under [lien] theory, the mortgagee acquires only a ‘lien’ on the
mortgaged real estate and the mortgagor retains both legal and equitable title and the right to
possession until foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure.”).
115. See 4 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.27, at 37-177 to
-178 (2010) (“Because mortgages involve an interest in land, the usual formalities for
transferring property interests must be met. . . . As with other transactions involving real estate,
it is always important to record the document creating the real estate interest—in this case the
assignment.”); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 2011) (“Like a
sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that
requires a writing signed by the grantor.”).
116. See 14 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.02[1][b] (2012),
at 82-15 to -17.
117. Cf. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 426 (7th ed. 2012) (noting that a certificate of title “is prima facie evidence of
ownership, but if ownership is with a person other than the person shown on the certificate, the
certificate is no impediment to proof of that fact”).
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Property is recorded in county land records. Every county or
118
parish in the United States has a real-estate recordation system. The
precise details and operations of these local land records vary, but, in
most cases, title to land can be determined by a search of local land
records.
Local land records also track various encumbrances on land,
such as easements or liens, but only to the extent that these
119
encumbrances have been recorded. Most states do not require
120
mortgage liens to be recorded in local land records, but there are
121
exceptions. Similarly, statutory liens, such as state tax liens and
construction liens, are not always recorded.
Accordingly, mortgage recording is not meant to be a title system
for mortgages per se. Instead, it is meant to be a notice and a priority
system, providing potential lenders with information about whether a
property is encumbered and then ranking competing encumbrances.
Yet, by serving as a priority system, mortgage recording is a de facto
title system for mortgages. Compliance with the formalities of
recording vests the mortgagee with superior rights and locks in the
mortgage’s priority vis-à-vis competing liens. Lack of recording
makes a mortgagee vulnerable to becoming subordinated to a
subsequent recorded mortgage, thereby reducing the value of the

118. Several states also have additional, nonmandatory Torrens registration systems, usually
at the state level, which register actual title rather than recording documentary evidence of title.
See R.G. Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration, 19 MINN. L. REV. 519, 524
(1934). In a Torrens system, the state investigates title. If satisfied after the investigation, the
state registers title. Registered owners have indefeasible title. The state provides
indemnification for any legitimate claimant to superior title, but only monetary relief is possible;
the property remains with the registered owner. Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The
Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance, 10 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 81, 81–82 (1995)
(noting that Torrens systems establish public funds to compensate legitimate claimants to
registered land who emerge after registration). In a Torrens system, transfer of title is effective
only upon registration of the transfer.
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.1, 5.1 (2000).
120. See, e.g., Nevada ex rel. Bates v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 493 F. App’x 872,
874 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that there is no duty to record a mortgage in Nevada).
121. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-2-1 (2010) (“Every deed conveying lands shall be
recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the land is located.”
(emphasis added)); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 765 5/28 (West 2001) (“Deeds, mortgages, powers of
attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate in this state, shall
be recorded in the county in which such real estate is situated . . . .” (emphasis added));
Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that
the “shall be recorded” language in the Pennsylvania recording statute, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. § 351
(West 2001), requires all real-estate conveyances, including assignments of mortgages, to be
recorded).
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unrecorded mortgage. Moreover, lack of recording makes a
mortgagee vulnerable to having the lien voided because a subsequent
bona fide purchaser will take the property without being subject to
122
the unrecorded lien. Lack of recording also makes a mortgage
vulnerable to being avoided by a trustee in the mortgagor’s
123
bankruptcy. Priority ultimately means freedom from competing
claims and security in the property rights.
Recording may also vest the mortgagee with enhanced
enforcement rights. Although an unrecorded mortgage is generally
124
enforceable against the mortgagor, in some states, nonjudicial
foreclosure—usually a faster and cheaper procedure than judicial
125
foreclosure—is only available for recorded mortgages. Being able to
proceed through nonjudicial foreclosure might be analogized to
freedom from some defenses because defenses are not raised in the
nonjudicial setting, but only in litigation brought by the homeowner
to stop or invalidate the nonjudicial foreclosure, in which the burdens
of persuasion might be different.
Therefore, there is a strong incentive for a mortgagee to record
the mortgage in the local land records. This situation is analogous to
the choice between using a negotiable or nonnegotiable promissory
note. Neither negotiability nor recording is required, but both confer
greater legal rights and require greater—and costlier—formalities.
Nonetheless, because recording is generally not mandatory, land
records are an incomplete mortgage title system.
Still, if a mortgage is recorded, then the land records start to
serve as a title system for that mortgage. Evidence of a transfer of a
recorded mortgage is created by filing the appropriate notice of
assignment in the local land records. Typically such an assignment

122. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057, 1083 n.88 (1954) (discussing cases in which a “bona fide purchaser of note and mortgage
would lose to a bona fide purchaser of the property whenever the mortgage was not recorded”).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012).
124. See 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 924 (2009) (“The assignment of a note and mortgage
does not need to be recorded to be valid.”).
125. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5 (West 2012) (“The power of sale may be exercised by
the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14162(b) (Supp. 2013) (providing that the security instrument vests the secured creditor with title
to the security instrument); NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.210(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (“A mortgage of
real property . . . which has been assigned may not be enforced unless and until the assignment
is recorded.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (2011) (“[T]he trustee may foreclose a trust deed by
advertisement and sale if . . . there is a default by the grantor . . . and the trustee or beneficiary
has filed for record in the country clerk’s office . . . .”).
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requires paying a fee to the county; absent payment of the fee, the
transfer will not be recorded. Although it is still possible to have an
unrecorded assignment, the rights of such an assignee are possibly
126
inferior to those of a subsequent recorded lienholder or purchaser.
The mortgage will remain in the county land records until such time
as a release of the lien is filed. The release can be filed only by the
record holder of the mortgage; an unrecorded transferee of a
mortgage cannot release a recorded lien. Thus, a typical title search as
part of a real-estate closing will involve a search only for recorded
mortgages and recorded assignments, as well as recorded releases.
C. The Uneasy Coexistence of UCC Article 3 and Land Records
The UCC Article 3 and land record systems emerged and
remained separate for path-dependent reasons: negotiable-instrument
127
law as a means of monetizing debts and land records as a means of
128
clarifying title to land. Neither was primarily designed as a mortgage
title system. But, because both serve as de facto title systems for
mortgages, they can potentially produce conflicting title: the
mortgagee of record may not match with the holder of the note. Few
states have clear law on how this conflict is to be resolved,
particularly in regards to who can foreclose.
Despite the potential tension between the note and land records
systems for mortgage title, the systems worked together with little
incident for over a century. Historically, the potential title-system
conflict rarely mattered because the systems typically matched and
transfers of either notes or mortgages were relatively rare. When a
conflict did exist, it was unlikely to be an issue except in the unusual
event of a foreclosure. Foreclosures were fairly rare, however, prior
129
to the bursting of the housing bubble, and most foreclosures were
130
default judgments. Usually there was no question that a payment
126. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 183, § 5 (2011) (providing that purchasers without
notice may rely conclusively on real-estate records).
127. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.
129. See MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY (2010) (indicating
foreclosure rates of 2 percent or less in terms of the number of outstanding mortgages from 1979
until 2007).
130. Statistics on default judgment rates are hard to come by, but a 2008 New York State
Unified Court System study states that default judgments occur in approximately 90 percent of
foreclosure cases. JUDITH S. KAYE & ANN PFAU, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES:
PROMOTING EARLY COURT INTERVENTION 1 (2008), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
whatsnew/pdf/ResidentialForeclosure6-08.pdf.
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default had occurred, and cultural norms dissuaded shamed
borrowers from litigating based on “technicalities.” In the unlikely
event a borrower did litigate, settlement was feasible for institutional
lenders because it would be a one-off occurrence. All of this changed,
however, as mortgage finance shifted from balance-sheet lending to
securitization.
II. THE SHIFT IN MORTGAGE FINANCING TO SECURITIZATION
Securitization is a relatively recent development in residential
131
mortgage lending. Residential mortgages began to be securitized in
132
1970,
but securitization remained a relatively small part of
133
American housing finance prior to the 1980s. In 1979 only 10
percent of outstanding mortgages by dollar amount were
134
securitized. Instead, mortgage lending was primarily a local affair
135
conducted through depositaries’ balance sheets, so mortgage loans
were rarely transferred.
The S&L crisis, however, made clear that depositaries were illsuited to manage the asset-liability-duration mismatch risk posed by
financing long-term, fixed-rate loans through deposits. As a result,
136
securitization boomed.
By 1983, 20 percent of outstanding
mortgages by dollar amount were securitized, and a decade later fully
131. There have been several earlier episodes of quasi-securitization financing for farm and
commercial mortgage loans in U.S. history going back to the 1870s. See Kenneth Snowden,
Mortgage Securitization in the United States: Twentieth Century Developments in Historical
Perspective, in ANGLO-AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 261, 274–75 (Michael D. Bordo &
Richard Sylla eds., 1996) (“[T]he first group of banks financed western city building in the
1870s, the second provided mortgage credit for agricultural settlement in the Great Plains
during the 1880s, and the last helped fuel agricultural expansion during and immediately after
World War I.”).
132. See Jonathan Tower, Ginnie Mae Pool No. 1: A Revolution Is Paid Off, SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at F1 (noting that the sale of the first mortgage-backed security (MBS)
was in February 1970). Although Fannie Mae has existed since 1938, it did not engage in
securitization until 1981. Instead, it held mortgages it purchased on a balance sheet and financed
them through the issuance of corporate debt.
133. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J.
1177, 1188–89 (2012).
134. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE
STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS,
BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS HISTORICAL ANNUAL
TABLES 1975–1984, tbl.L.218 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/
Current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf (the sum of lines 19 and 20 divided by line 1).
135. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1120–21 (2013).
136. Id. at 1165.
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half of outstanding mortgages by dollar amount were securitized.
Today nearly two-thirds of mortgage dollars outstanding are
138
securitized.
The transformation of the mortgage market from a balance-sheet
lending market to a securitization market had important implications
for the documentation of mortgage transfers. Securitizations are
financing transactions structured as sales. Therefore, securitizations
require loans to be transferred, often multiple times. Residential
mortgage securitization also involves a scalar change in mortgage
transfers. Instead of loans being transferred one at a time, thousands
are transferred en masse.
The critical feature of securitization is that it involves the
issuance of debt obligations against a pool of assets that have been
segregated from the other assets and liabilities of the securitizer. The
assets are segregated through a sale to a specially created, legally
separate entity that issues the debt. The reason for the asset
segregation is to enable debt obligations to be priced solely on the
quality of the segregated assets rather than on the total picture of a
firm’s assets and liabilities. When a firm issues debt, the debt is priced
based on the debt’s claim to the firm’s assets, which means that it
would be priced based on the total picture of the firm’s assets and
liabilities: What assets does the firm have, and what are the
competing claims (liabilities) to the assets?
A firm can raise funds on potentially more advantageous terms if
it can borrow solely against its assets, not its assets and liabilities.
Securitization enabled such borrowing. To do so, a firm sells assets to
a legally separate, specially created entity. The legally separate entity
pays for the assets by issuing debt. Because the entity is designed to
have almost no other liabilities, the debt it issues will be priced simply
on the quality of the transferred assets, without any concern about
139
competing claims to those assets. Therefore, ensuring that the assets
are transferred and are free of competing claims is central to
securitization.
Although residential-mortgage securitization transactions are
complex and vary somewhat depending on the type of entity
undertaking the securitization, there is still a core standard
137. Id. at 1155.
138. Id.
139. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23–30 (1996) (noting the
use of asset securitization to shield the transferor, rather than the transferee, from claims).
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transaction. First, a financial institution (the “sponsor” or “seller”)
assembles a pool of mortgage loans either made (“originated”) by an
affiliate of the financial institution or purchased from unaffiliated
141
third-party originators. Second, the pool of loans is sold by the
sponsor to a special-purpose subsidiary (the “depositor”) that has no
other assets or liabilities and is little more than a legal entity with a
mailbox. This is done to segregate the loans from the sponsor’s assets
142
and liabilities. Third, the depositor sells the loans to a passive,
specially created, single-purpose vehicle (SPV), typically a trust in the
case of residential-mortgage securitization. The trustee will then
typically convey the mortgage notes and security instruments to a
document custodian for safekeeping. The SPV issues certificated debt
143
securities to raise the funds to pay for the loans. As these debt
securities are backed by the cash flow from the mortgages, they are
called mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
A typical mortgage securitization thus has a set of transfers of
both the notes and the mortgages from the originator to the seller to
the depositor to the trust, with a bailment to the document custodian.
We might think of this series of transfers as a sequence going from
ABCD, as indicated in Figure 1, below. Bankruptcy, tax,
accounting, and bank-regulatory-capital purposes mandate that each
of these transfers be real and verifiable. If the transfer only goes
directly from AD or from ABD, without the intermediary

140. The structure illustrated is for private-label MBS. Ginnie Mae and governmentsponsored enterprise (GSE) securitizations are structured somewhat differently.
141. The seller might itself be a special-purpose subsidiary of a holding company; for private
label securitization, sellers were sometimes themselves special-purpose asset-backed
commercial paper issuers, such as Countrywide’s Park Granada, Park Monaco, and Park Sienna
entities.
142. This intermediate entity is not essential to securitization, but, since 2002, Statement of
Financial Accountings Standards 140 has required this additional step for off-balance-sheet
treatment because of the possibility that if the originator went bankrupt or into receivership, the
securitization would be treated as a secured loan, rather than a sale, and the originator would
exercise its equitable right of redemption to reclaim the securitized assets. ACCOUNTING FOR
TRANSFER AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000);
Learning the Norwalk Two-Step, HEADS UP (Deloitte & Touche, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 25,
2011, at 1, 1, available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/dt_headsup.pdf. Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 166, effective January 1, 2010, has largely mooted the issue
of off-balance-sheet treatment in GSE securitizations. See generally ACCOUNTING FOR
TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 166 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
143. The procedure works slightly differently in Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac
securitizations, which are also known as “Agency” securitizations.
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transfers to B or C, the transaction might not achieve the various
144
145
146
credit rating,
tax,
and accounting and bankbankruptcy,
147
regulatory-capital benefits that are vital to making securitization
economically viable. Therefore, being able to provide clear evidence
of the sequences of transfers from ABCD—that is, from the
originator to the seller to the depositor to the trust—is critical for
securitizations.

144. For securitizations, it is critical that the trust be bankruptcy remote, meaning that the
trust’s assets are not affected by the bankruptcy of the depositor, seller, or originator.
(Bankruptcy remote has a distinct second meaning, namely, that the trust itself cannot file for
bankruptcy.) In other words, the segregated assets must be free of any claims competing with
those of the trust. This is accomplished by making sure that the transfers are all “true sales,” so
that the transferred assets cannot be claimed as property of the bankruptcy estate of the
depositor, seller, or originator. See infra notes 226–37 and accompanying text.
145. Credit rating agencies are particularly concerned about true-sale treatment because of
the bankruptcy remoteness issues discussed above, see supra note 144, and will not rate, absent a
true-sale opinion letter.
146. Mortgage securitizations are structured for the securitization vehicle to achieve passthrough tax status. Absent pass-through tax status, the securitization vehicle would be taxed on
its income from the mortgage loans, and the MBS investors would be taxed on their income
from the MBS. Two levels of taxation would make the economics of mortgage securitization
unattractive. Therefore, MBS are typically structured to have pass-through status as either
grantor trusts or Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMIC). Absent the transfer of
the mortgages to the pass-through entity, however, there would be two levels of taxation.
Moreover, REMIC rules require that transfers occur within a limited time period, see 26 U.S.C.
§§ 860D(a)(3)–(4) (2006) (requiring substantially all assets of a REMIC to be qualified
mortgages acquired within ninety days of the REMIC’s creation or other permitted
investments); id. § 860G(a)(3) (defining “qualified mortgage”), or suffer tax penalties, see id.
§ 860F(a) (imposing a 100 percent tax penalty on net income from prohibited transactions). As a
result, MBS transactions are carefully designed to prohibit any activities that would jeopardize
pass-through tax status, and tax opinion letters are used to instill confidence in the pass-through
status.
147. Financial institutions are required to hold regulatory capital and reserve for losses
against their assets. Regulatory-capital requirements follow from Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles. Sale treatment enables off-balance-sheet accounting treatment, which
reduces regulatory capital, thereby enabling increased leverage and greater returns on equity,
all else equal.

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE
E
)

11/13/2013 5:555 PM

674

[Vol. 63::637

DUKE LAW
L
JOURN
NAL

o Note and Mortgage
M
in Typical Secu
uritization
Figure 1. Transfer of
Borrrower
Note & Mortgage
Orig
ginator (A)
Note & Mortgage
Spon
nsor or Selle
er (B)
Note & Mortgage
Depositor (C)
Note & Mortgage
Trusst (D)
Securitiies (MBS)
Inve
estors

uritization en
nables investtors to investt based onlyy on
Allthough secu
the risk
ks involved in the segreg
gated assets, m
most MBS in
nvestors do not
want to
o assume cre
edit risk. Th
his is becausse they recognize that th
hey
are at an
a inherent informationa
i
al disadvant age regardin
ng credit risk
k to
the fina
ancial institu
utions that pa
ackage and ssell MBS. In
n other word
ds, a
148
1
lemonss problem lurrks in MBS. As a resullt, most MBS
S are structured
1499
to elim
minate all bu
ut nominal credit
c
risk. So-called ““Agency” M
MBS
(Ginnie
e Mae, Fann
nie Mae, an
nd Freddie M
Mac MBS) aare guaranteeed
150
explicittly or impliicitly by the
e U.S. goveernment. N
Non-Agency or

148. See
S generally Geo
orge A. Akerlof, The Market forr “Lemons”: Quaality Uncertainty and
the Markeet Mechanism, 84
4 Q. J. ECON. 488
8 (1970) (hypotheesizing lemons m
markets); see also, e.g.,
Paul Cale
em, Christopher Henderson
H
& Jon
nathan Liles, “Ch
herry Picking” in
n Subprime Morttgage
Securitiza
ations: Which Sub
bprime Mortgagee Loans Were So
old by Depositoryy Institutions Prio
or to
the Crisiss of 2007?, 20 J.. HOUSING ECO
ON. 120, 134 (201
11) (finding emp
pirical evidence that
depositaries cherry-picked
d which loans to securitize based
d on dimensions of risk that invesstors
tend to diisregard or view overly
o
optimisticcally); Chris Dow
wning, Dwight Jafffe & Nancy Walllace,
Is the Ma
arket for Mortga
age-Backed Securrities a Market ffor Lemons?, 222 REV. FIN. STUD
DIES
2457, 2459
9 (2009) (finding evidence of a “le
emons spread” in
n Freddie Mac seecuritizations).
149. See
S Kathleen C. Engel
E
& Patricia
a A. McCoy, Turn
ning a Blind Eyee: Wall Street Fin
nance
of Predattory Lending, 75
5 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 20554–76 (2007) (no
oting how MBS
S are
structured
d to allay lemons concerns).
150. Ginnie
G
Mae MB
BS are backed by
y the full faith and credit of th
he U.S. governm
ment.
Fannie Mae
M and Freddie Mac MBS are guaranteed by tthese GSEs and are perceived to
o be

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 5:55 PM

THE PAPER CHASE

675

“private-label” MBS utilize a variety of credit enhancements to
reduce credit risk, most importantly, senior-subordinate tranching,
meaning that the MBS are issued in a senior-subordinate structure,
151
with the senior MBS being repaid before the subordinate MBS. As
a result, over 90 percent of private-label MBS are rated AAA at
152
issuance, meaning that both default risk and loss-given-default are
expected to be negligible. Accordingly, AAA-rated MBS are effective
investment substitutes for Agency MBS, with comparable risks and
returns.
Investors in these AAA-rated, private-label MBS generally
believed that they were assuming only interest-rate risk, not credit
risk. Were it otherwise, they would have demanded higher yields than
treasuries or Agency MBS, which could only be supported by higher
interest-rate mortgages. Thus, to make securitization a competitive
method of financing mortgages, it was necessary to convince most
MBS investors that credit risk—meaning both the risk of competing
claims and the risk of enforcement of the mortgages—had been
neutralized.
Securitization thus reproduces key features of both negotiability
and mortgage recordation: freedom from claims and enhanced
153
enforceability.
Securitization replicates freedom from claims
through the creation of a segregated asset pool that is free from the
claims of creditors of the entity that created the pool. For investors in
AAA-rated tranches, securitization also reproduces the effect of
enforcement rights through credit enhancement. The AAA-investors
can count on getting paid, irrespective of the defenses that can be
raised to the mortgages or limitations on enforcements. Beyond this,
securitization creates liquidity in the form of readily transferable
securities (which may themselves be negotiable under UCC Article
8). In short, securitization is “synthetic negotiability.”
The quality of this synthetic negotiability varies depending on
the level of credit enhancement, but significantly, it is achieved
without requiring the demonstrative formalities of UCC Article 3 or
implicitly backed by the U.S. government. For the technical workings of these different types of
MBS, see Levitin & Wachter, supra note 135, at 1144–48, 1159–63.
151. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 133, at 1191–92 (detailing credit-enhancement
structures in private-label MBS).
152. See Jie He, Jun Qian & Phillip E. Strahan, Credit Ratings and the Evolution of the
Mortgage-Backed Securities Market, 101 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCS. 131, 133–34 (2011).
153. See Janger, supra note 91, at 41–43 (noting how securitization replicates key features of
negotiability to enhance liquidity).
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land recordation. For all MBS investors, however, freedom from
claims is contingent upon being able to prove that the transfer of the
mortgage loans to the trust was in fact a sale rather than a financing.
The entire edifice of securitization depends upon being able to show
that the transfers did in fact occur, which is a matter of mortgage title
systems.
III. SECURITIZATION-ERA MORTGAGE TITLE SYSTEMS
Public demonstration regimes like UCC Article 3 and land
recordation fit well with a paper-based economy in which mortgage
loans did not undergo repeated transfers. They are an uncomfortable
fit, however, with the twenty-first-century shift in the medium of
155
business from paper to electronic. Nor do they work well with
securitization because securitization involves multiple mass transfers
of assets—at a minimum from the originator to the seller to the
depositor to the trust. Each separate transfer would require
compliance with costly formalities in a public demonstration regime,
including physical movements of paper.
The securitization industry—meaning the financial institutions
that package and sell MBS (the “sell-side”)—attempted to evolve out
of the transaction costs created by public demonstration regimes
through both private ordering and law reform. The securitization
industry created a private mortgage registry known as the MERS as a
means of moving most of its transactions out of the public landrecords system, thereby avoiding recordation fees. And through a
little-noticed provision included as part of a major revision of
Article 9 of the UCC, a new mechanism was created for transferring
mortgage notes. Through the MERS and the UCC revision, the
securitization industry created a pair of “contracting” regimes for
mortgage title that substitute for the traditional public demonstration
regimes. These contracting regimes did not reconcile the tension
between title systems, and the financial crisis has begun to pull back
the curtain on a dysfunctional market infrastructure.

154. See id.
155. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 162 (“The worlds of finance and commerce have changed
dramatically [since the late eighteenth century], but the law of notes has been largely constant.
This phenomenon—changing commercial practices governed by unchanging law—is the recipe
for a commercial calamity.”).
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A. MERS
1. MERS Background. MERS operates a private mortgage
156
registry known as the MERS System. MERS was created in 1993 by
the major sell-side players in the residential-mortgage market to
provide an efficient electronic mortgage recording system that tracks
ownership and servicing interests in mortgages without requiring
157
recordation of transfers in local land records. The creation of
158
MERS was driven by the demands of mortgage securitization.
MERS gained such widespread adoption that by 2007, it was
estimated that 60 percent of mortgages outstanding were held in
159
MERS’s name,
roughly corresponding to the percentage of
outstanding mortgage dollars that were securitized.
MERS is a private, contractual superstructure that is grafted
onto the public land-recordation system. Financial institutions that
are members of MERS register the loans they service (but do not
necessarily own) with the MERS System electronic database. Each
loan receives a unique identifier known as a MERS Identification
Number (MIN). The MIN is sometimes stamped on the note or
sometimes simply recorded in the lender’s own records. MERS is
then inserted in the local land records as the mortgagee, instead of
the actual lender. Sometimes this involves an assignment of the
mortgage from the lender to MERS, but the more prevalent
arrangement has MERS recorded as the original mortgagee, thereby
obviating any recordation of assignments. MERS serves as the
mortgagee of record, but only as a nominee for the actual lender and
160
supposedly for its successors and assigns. The language included in
MERS mortgages is that MERS is acting “solely as nominee for
161
Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” MERS claims no
beneficial interest whatsoever in the loan.
156. MERS is a subsidiary of MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., which is in turn owned by a
consortium of financial institutions. About Us, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/aboutus (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
157. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (D. Mass. 2011); David P.
Weber, The Magic of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System: It Is and It Isn’t, 85 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 239, 239 (2011).
158. Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration
System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 116 (2011).
159. Kate Berry, Foreclosures Turn up Heat on MERS, AM. BANKER (July 10, 2007, 1:00
AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/172_135/-316827-1.html.
160. Peterson, supra note 158, at 118.
161. See Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit B, supra note 53, at 3.
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MERS’s goal is to immobilize mortgage title through a commonagency structure by acting as nominee for the lender and those
subsequent transferees of the lender that are members of MERS.
Although legal title remains in MERS’s name, subsequent transfers
are supposed to be tracked in MERS’s database. Thus, MERS aims to
achieve the priority and enforcement benefits of public recordation
while tracking beneficial ownership title in its own database.
MERS’s operation has two important implications. First, instead
of paying county recordation and transfer fees, financial institutions
162
pay only for MERS membership and MERS transaction fees.
MERS thus offers potential cost savings in the securitization process
through the avoidance of local recording fees. Second, MERS’s
electronic database, not the county land records, represents the main
evidentiary source for determining who is currently the real party in
interest on a mortgage.
In theory, MERS’s database tracks two distinct characteristics:
the identity of the party with the rights to service the mortgage (often
an agent for the trustee for the trust created for the ultimate
beneficial owners of the mortgage loan) and the legal title to
mortgages (for example, the trustee for the trust created for the
163
ultimate beneficial owners of the mortgage). MERS’s publicly
available records do not track chain of title. It is impossible for
outsiders to determine if transfers were made in the MERS system
164
and when. Instead, MERS publicly tracks only the current servicer
165
and sometimes the current beneficial owner of a loan.
A major problem with MERS as a title system is that it is not
accurate and reliable in terms of what it reports. MERS’s members
are nominally required to report transfers of mortgage servicing
rights to MERS, but MERS does not actually compel reporting of
servicing-rights transfers, and there is little incentive to be punctual
162. Peterson, supra note 158, at 117. MERSCORP, Inc.’s parent, MERSCORP Holdings,
Inc., is owned by the some of the largest banks, servicers, private mortgage insurers, and Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Shareholders, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/shareholders
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
163. MERS states that it tracks “beneficial ownership interests,” but by this MERS really
means legal title, rather than ultimate beneficial interests. See FAQ, MERS, http://www.mersinc.
org/information-for-homeowners/faq-information-for-homeowners (last visited Oct. 19, 2013)
(“The MERS® System is a national electronic database that tracks changes in mortgage
servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in loans secured by residential real estate.”).
164. Peterson, supra note 158, at 125–30. Internally, MERS is able to track servicing
transfers and transfers of beneficial ownership, but only to the extent reported by servicers.
165. Id. at 129.
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166

with reporting. Indeed, the lack of record validation combined with
voluntary reporting has led a federal judge to describe MERS as “the
167
Wikipedia of land registration systems.” Not surprisingly, the
information in the MERS database is often inaccurate or
168
incomplete.
MERS does not even formally require any reporting of legal title
to the mortgages, much less of transfers of legal title; any information
169
about legal title is supplied through strictly voluntary reporting.
When MERS does list the legal title, its database typically lists the
name of the securitization trustee if the mortgage is securitized, but
170
not the particular designation of the securitization trust. Given that
these trustees are financial institutions acting not in their own
capacity, nor even as generic trustees (such a capacity not existing),
but trustees for particular trusts (for example, Bank of New York
Mellon as trustee for Countrywide Alternative Loan Trust 200535CB, rather than simply Bank of New York Mellon or Bank of New
York Mellon as trustee), this disclosure is of limited use for
determining property rights because the leading trustee banks serve
thousands of distinct trusts. MERS, then, is really the agent of an
agent (the servicer) of a trustee for the ultimate beneficiaries of the
mortgage. In the MERS system, the link between the real economic
interest in a mortgage and recorded title is long and attenuated.
MERS’s database functions as a do-it-yourself private mortgage
recordation system. Historically, MERS itself has had only around
fifty employees who perform corporate and technology support
171
functions. Employees of MERS’s members carry out most of the
tasks done in MERS’s name, including the making of entries in the

166. See Verified Complaint at 4–5, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 6987-CS, 2012 WL
1949867 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2012), 2011 WL 5128209. The Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1641(g) (2012), and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b)–
(c), require that borrowers be notified of changes in ownership or servicing.
167. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (D. Mass. 2011).
168. See, e.g., Verified Complaint, supra note 166, at 5 (alleging a 21 percent inaccuracy rate
for MERS recording in a sample of one hundred loans); AEQUITAS COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS,
FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 13 (2012), available at
http://aequitasaudit.com/images/aequitas_sf_report.pdf (noting that MERS records matched
with the deed-of-trust beneficiary only 42 percent of the time); Alan M. White, Losing the
Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 468, 486–87 (2012).
169. Peterson, supra note 158, at 117, 127.
170. Id. at 129.
171. Verified Complaint, supra note 166, at 8.
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MERS database. These employees of MERS’s members are listed as
assistant secretaries or vice presidents of MERS, but they have no
actual employment relationship with MERS. There are over twenty
172
thousand of these “corporate signing officers.” Accordingly, a
transfer of either servicing or legal title in the MERS system involves
nothing more than an employee of a MERS member entering the
transfer in the MERS database.
A transfer within the MERS system involves voluntary selfreporting and nothing more and therefore fails to incentivize timely,
accurate reporting. There are no formalities to a transfer in the
MERS system. As a result, MERS may not in fact know who its
principal is within the common-agency arrangement at any given
point in time because MERS is relying on reporting from its
members.
2. Structural Problems with MERS. Beyond lack of reliable
accuracy, MERS’s registry is problematic as a title system because it
stands on uncertain legal grounds. MERS lacks statutory authority.
To the extent the MERS suffices to perfect and track interests in
mortgages, it is on the basis of agency-law principles. But this only
raises a host of questions: Can a mortgage be perfected by recording
it in the name of a common agent, or does state law require
mortgages be recorded in the name of the legal owner? The UCC
expressly permits financing statements for security interests in
personalty to be recorded in the name of “a representative of the
173
secured party” and that failure to indicate this representative
174
capacity does not affect the validity of a UCC financing statement.
But parallel provisions are not found in state mortgage recordation
statutes. If recordation in the name of a common agent is allowed,
what happens when the mortgage is transferred to a party that is not a
principal of the common agent? And is there a limit to how
attenuated this agency may be? What is the effect of a sham
subagency arrangement? These issues are considered below.
a. Lack of Statutory Authorization. MERS is designed to operate
like the Depository Trust Company (DTC), but for mortgage loans
instead of securities. Historically, securities transactions cleared

172. Id. at 9–10.
173. UCC § 9-502(a)(2) (2011).
174. Id. § 9-503(d).
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physically: the seller of a security had to deliver the physical stock
certificate—itself a type of negotiable instrument—or bond to the
175
buyer. This was an obviously cumbersome system, and by the mid176
1960s rising trading volume had overwhelmed Wall Street. By 1968,
over fifteen-million trades were occurring daily, all necessitating
177
physical delivery. Back offices became overwhelmed and deliveries
lagged, creating major problems in the market as parties failed to
178
meet their delivery obligations. In December 1968 alone, no less
than $4.12 billion in trades failed to meet on-time delivery. The
liability from these operational deficiencies set off “the greatest rash
179
of broker-dealer firm failures in Wall Street’s history.”
A critical part of the solution to the “Wall Street Paperwork
Crisis” was the creation of the DTC. The DTC used a commonagency structure with a book-entry record system to immobilize
180
physical securities. In the DTC system, instead of individual
investors being listed as registered securities’ owners with various
firms, the DTC is listed in corporate-securities registrations, using the
181
name Cede & Co., as common nominee for the investors. The
physical securities are then held in the DTC’s vaults, and the DTC
182
tracks the ownership of the securities on its books. The DTC now
immobilizes between 85 and 90 percent of all equities, corporate, and
183
municipal bonds issued in paper form in the United States.
The DTC acts as a common agent for all parties using its
services, substituting its own book-entry system for those of the
184
individual securities’ issuers. Thus, instead of thousands of separate
book-entry systems, each requiring paper to move back and forth for

175. Indeed, many bonds were issued in bearer form prior to the 1982 federal prohibition on
domestic issuance of bearer bonds.
176. See Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to
1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 193–200 (2000).
177. ALEC BENN, THE UNSEEN WALL STREET OF 1969–1975, at 14 (2000).
178. Wells, supra note 176, at 203–06.
179. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 452 (3d ed. 2003).
180. VIRGINIA B. MORRIS & STUART Z. GOLDSTEIN, GUIDE TO CLEARANCE &
SETTLEMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO DTCC 6–7 (2009).
181. VIRGINIA B. MORRIS & STUART Z. GOLDSTEIN, LIFE CYCLE OF A SECURITY 9–10
(2010). “Cede” is an acronym for “Central Depository.” Id. at 9.
182. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 6–7.
183. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 181, at 10.
184. Id. Although MERS is designed to operate as a common agency, one potential
complication is that the depositor entities in securitizations are almost never MERS members
and thus have not consented to the common agency.
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every transaction, the DTC uses a single book-entry system without
185
any movement of paper. Although the use of the DTC is not
required for individual investors, its use is virtually mandated for
186
institutional transactions.
MERS copies the DTC structure by inserting itself, rather than
the lender, as the mortgagee in the local land records to immobilize
legal title to mortgages and then by tracking the beneficial ownership
(or at least the servicing agent of the beneficial owner) of the
187
mortgages in its book-entry system. MERS was designed to obviate
the need for paperwork to move for transfers to occur in its bookentry system. The idea animating MERS is to “[p]rocess loans, not
188
paperwork.”
Critically, the DTC operates within a statutory framework. It is a
189
“securities intermediary” under UCC Article 8. This means that
even though the physical securities are held by the DTC, they are not
190
the DTC’s property but the property of the investors. The DTC also
191
has legal duties to comply with the investors’ instructions, and the
192
investors’ rights vis-à-vis third parties are set out by statute. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also regulates the DTC
as a registered clearing agency, so DTC rules must be approved by
193
the SEC.

185. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 7.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (2012) (requiring the SEC to “use its authority . . . to end the
physical movement of securities certificates in connection with the settlement among brokers
and dealers of transactions in securities”).
187. Note that because the beneficial owners of a MERS registered mortgage are typically
trusts, the real economic beneficiaries in interest, the MBS investors, are yet a further step
removed.
188. Michelle Conlin, State Court Ruling Deals Blow to U.S. Bank Mortgage System,
REUTERS, Sept. 14, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-foreclosurescourtcase-washington-idUSBRE88D1OF20120914.
189. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (2011).
190. See id. § 8-102(a)(9) (defining “financial asset”); id. § 8-102(a)(15) (defining
“security”); § 8-102(a)(17) (defining “security entitlement”); id. § 8-501 (creating security
entitlement); id. § 8-503 (providing that “all interests” in a financial asset held by a “securities
intermediary” are the property interest of the security-entitlement holder, not the securities
intermediary).
191. See id. §§ 8-506, 8-507.
192. Id. §§ 8-502, 8-510, 8-511.
193. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s, 78q-1 (2012).
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No equivalent statutory or regulatory framework exists for
194
MERS. Instead, MERS is a set of private contractual arrangements
grafted onto a preexisting public legal structure—local land-recording
offices. The closest MERS comes to a legal authorization is a
questionable opinion letter from Covington & Burling LLP that lacks
a fifty-state analysis of MERS’s operations, despite variations in realproperty law that could very well affect MERS’s validity for various
195
functions.
Lacking a statutory framework, MERS stands on
principles of agency law, but the interaction of agency law with
mortgage recordation statutes is not well-established.
To the extent that land records are merely meant to serve as a
notice system regarding potential claims, rather than as a title system
defining rights, recordation in the name of an agent should not
present a problem. But if land records are meant to also perform a
title function—and they do on a de facto basis, as well as providing a
de jure presumption of title—then recording a mortgage in the name
of an agent like MERS seems more problematic. As a positive matter,
there is a question of the interaction of what state recordation
statutes provide. But as a normative matter that potentially affects
judicial interpretation of recordation statutes, there is a public
196
interest in having transparency of ownership in society. In the case
of mortgage loans, there is a particular public interest in transparency
so as to facilitate the restructuring of distressed mortgages. If a
homeowner cannot figure out whom to contact about the mortgage,
restructuring is likely to be frustrated, even if it is efficient from a net197
social-welfare perspective.
This is not to say that MERS is illegal or invalid, but merely to
observe that it does not stand on the same sort of legal authority as
the DTC model. As a result, there are questions about the legal effect

194. In contrast, the UCC contemplates states using private parties to maintain state UCC
filing systems. See UCC § 9-501 legislative note.
195. Memorandum from Covington & Burling to R.K. Arnold, President and CEO,
MERSCORP, Inc. (Sept. 1, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing a legal
opinion on MERS as an original mortgagee, now the dominant form of MERS operations).
196. Although ownership interests could also be masked via the use of subsidiaries, limitedliability parent-subsidiary relationships are recorded in public records, whereas agency
relationships (and general partnerships and joint ventures) are matters of private contract.
197. See, e.g., Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C-11-2899 EMC, 2011 WL 6294472, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (describing plaintiff homeowner’s attempts to determine whom to
contact regarding alternatives to foreclosure on her securitized mortgage). Full disclosure: I was
retained as an expert witness for the plaintiff in this case, subsequent to the issuance of this
opinion.
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of MERS’s records that simply do not exist for the DTC’s records.
The underpinnings of roughly 60 percent of mortgage titles in the
United States are based on a questionable opinion letter. A 2012
federal district court ruling in an unjust enrichment suit by a
Pennsylvania county recorder of deeds has indicated that mortgages
assigned in the MERS system are not perfected under Pennsylvania
198
law.
b. Failure of Common Agency. Because MERS stands on
common-law agency principles, its authority is limited to the extent
that it is an agent. Although recordation in the name of a common
agent might work in theory, this is not what happened in most
private-label securitization transactions. (A different story exists for
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) securitizations, where
bankruptcy remoteness is not a concern.) In most securitization
transactions, the sponsor and the servicer are MERS members, but
not the depositor or the trustee in its role as trustee (the trustee may
belong to MERS in its corporate identity, but not in its trustee
identity). To the extent that MERS is not an agent for either
depositor or trustee, its common-agency structure might not work.
The depositor in most private-label securitization transactions is
199
a special-purpose subsidiary of the sponsor. Depositors are typically
not members of MERS. The depositor is, after all, only a legal-fiction
entity used to segregate the mortgages from the other assets of the
sponsor. Often the depositor will have no employees or assets other
than the mortgages (and associated notes). Therefore, no one ever
bothered having the depositors be MERS members, because
depositors are understood to be nothing more than a legal fiction
required by the rating agencies’ concerns over bankruptcy
remoteness. Thus, only sponsors and servicers were MERS members.
MERS’s common-agency structure would seem to break down
without depositor membership. As stated on its trust deeds, MERS
“is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and

198. See Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(holding that the “shall be recorded” language in the Pennsylvania recording statute requires all
real-estate conveyances, including assignments of mortgages, to be recorded); see also Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ark. 2009) (holding that
MERS was not required to receive notice of the foreclosure of a junior lien because it had no
interest in the deed of trust).
199. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (2011).
The depositor will also be the SEC shelf registrant.
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200

assigns.” But that would be true only to the extent that the
successors and assigns accept the agency relationship. The most
obvious indication of acceptance of the agency relationship—MERS
membership—does not apply to the depositor. Perhaps there is
apparent authority, but that is certainly not how the common agency
of MERS is supposed to work. If MERS is not an agent of the
depositor, it is unclear what, if any, effect there would be from the
mortgage continuing to be recorded in MERS’s name.
In most states, there would still presumably be a valid mortgage
201
enforceable against the borrower, but the mortgage might not be
perfected as against competing liens and purchasers. If the mortgage
becomes unperfected upon transfer to the depositor because it is not
recorded in the name of the depositor (or the depositor’s agent), any
preexisting junior mortgage on the property would then become the
202
senior mortgage, absent a resubordination agreement. Similarly,
any subsequent recorded lien or sale would take priority to the now
unperfected mortgage.
In most securitizations, the mortgage is only held by the
depositor for a nanosecond. The transfer from the sponsor to the
depositor is deemed to be instantaneously followed by the transfer
203
from the depositor to the trust. Therefore, if the mortgage were
subsequently perfected in the hands of the trust, its brief moment of
lack of perfection would not matter unless there was already a junior
mortgage on the property; subsequent liens and sale are unlikely to
be an issue. In many cases, however, there was in fact a junior
mortgage on the property at the time of the securitization of the
MERS mortgage. Thus, it is possible that many junior liens on
200. See, e.g., James v. ReconTrust Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (D. Ore. 2012) (emphasis
omitted).
201. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 (1997).
203. See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB
§ 2.01(a)–(b) (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1334744/
000090514805004294/efc5-1780_5738503ex991.txt (“Each Seller, concurrently with the execution
and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the
Depositor, without recourse, all its respective right, title and interest in and to the related Initial
Mortgage Loans . . . . Immediately upon the conveyance of the Initial Mortgage Loans referred
to in clause (a), the Depositor sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the
Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest
of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund . . . .”). This particular PSA contains duplicative
transfer language. See id. § 2.04 (“The Depositor hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to the
Trustee all of its rights with respect to the Mortgage Loans including, without limitation, the
representations and warranties of each Seller made pursuant to Section 2.03(a) . . . .”).
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mortgages in private-label securitizations may be entitled to senior
204
priority status because of the depositor lapse in the MERS system.
Even in cases in which there is not a preexisting junior mortgage
on the same property, the depositor lapse in MERS’s common-agency
system raises questions about perfection in the hands of the trustee,
meaning whether the trustee’s mortgage will have priority over
competing interests in the mortgaged property. Does the common
agency spring again when the mortgage is transferred to the trust? Or
is a new recording required? There is no clear answer to this, but
securitization industry practice has not taken MERS common-agency
structure seriously, in part because doing so would increase operating
burdens and costs.
c. Sham Agency. MERS’s use of corporate signing officers that
are actually employees of MERS’s members arguably indicates that
MERS’s entire common-agency structure is a sham and that there is
not in fact any real agency relationship, but rather simply principals
205
dealing directly with each other. MERS exercises no control over
206
the corporate signing officers. MERS’s corporate signing officers
are not meaningfully acting on MERS’s behalf, as they receive and
take no direction from MERS, but instead are acting on behalf of
207
their actual employers. Indeed, as MERS itself notes, “a certifying
204. A further complication is that securitization trustees are not members of MERS in their
trustee capacities. Trustees and servicers would seem to have authority for the use of MERS,
however, as it is clearly contemplated in PSAs. See id. § 2.01(c)(ii) (requiring delivery to the
trustee “for each Mortgage Loan that is not a MERS Mortgage Loan, the original recorded
Mortgage or a copy of such Mortgage certified by Countrywide as being a true and complete
copy of the Mortgage . . . and in the case of each MERS Mortgage Loan, the original Mortgage,
noting the presence of the MIN of the Mortgage Loans”).
205. See Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D. Mass. 2011) (“This Court is
deeply troubled that, with little to no oversight, individuals without any tie to or knowledge of
the company on whose behalf they are acting may assign mortgages—that is, they may transfer
legal title to someone else’s home. Equally troubling is the conflict of interest posed by these
certifying officers wearing ‘two hats’ simultaneously: that of assignor (as agent for MERS) and
assignee (as employee of the note holder or its servicing agent). Indeed, a MERS certifying
officer is more akin to an Admiral in the Georgia navy or a Kentucky Colonel with benefits
than he is to any genuine financial officer. In its rush to cash in on the sale of mortgage-backed
securities, the MERS system supplies the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to
the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors.” (citations
omitted)).
206. See Verified Complaint at 4, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 6987-CS, 2012 WL
1949867 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2012), 2011 WL 5128209.
207. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining “agency” as requiring
the agent to be acting on the principal’s behalf); id. § 3.15 (noting that subagency relationships
are defined by section 1.01).
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or signing officer is authorized to act on MERS’s behalf only with
respect to loans and mortgages registered in the MERS® System by
208
the Member for which the certifying or signing officer is an officer.”
This indicates that the entire use of common agency by MERS is in
fact a sham that courts might disregard if properly challenged, with
209
the result that MERS mortgages would be unperfected.
MERS was the creation of the sell-side of the securitization
industry, not MBS investors (the “buy-side”). MERS’s purpose was
to facilitate securitization on the front end by reducing the cost and
time of recording mortgage transfers. Disregard of or corner cutting
on agency-law principles helped further accomplish these cost and
time savings. Though MERS accomplished up-front cost and time
savings, it came at the cost of less clarity in terms of property rights

208. See Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion To Dismiss the Verified
Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure To State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted at 11, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2012 WL 1949867 (No. 6987-CS), 2012 WL
168257.
209. UCC § 9-313 cmt. 3 (“The fact of dual agency is not of itself inconsistent with the
secured party’s having taken possession . . . . The debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the
secured party for purposes of the secured party’s taking possession. And, under appropriate
circumstances, a court may determine that a person in possession is so closely connected to or
controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession, even though the
person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the secured party. If so, the person’s
taking possession would not constitute the secured party’s taking possession and would not be
sufficient for perfection.”). As a “secured party” and “debtor” are defined in UCC Article 9 as
respectively including a buyer and a seller of a promissory note, id. §§ 9-102(a)(72)(D),
9-102(a)(28)(B), the comment can be read as “The fact of dual agency is not itself inconsistent
with the buyer of the promissory note having taken possession . . . . The seller of the note cannot
qualify as an agent for the buyer of the note for purposes of the buyer's taking possession. And
under appropriate circumstances a court may determining that a person in possession is so
closely connected to or controlled by the seller that the seller has retained effective possession,
even though the person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the buyer. If so, the
person's taking possession would not constitute the buyer's taking possession and would not be
sufficient for giving the buyer superior title to competing parties.” Thus, even if one were to
take the agency of MERS’s corporate signing officers seriously, they only complicate the agency
structure underlying MERS. MERS is the common agent of mortgage servicers, but the
servicers’ employees are then the agents of MERS. Can a principal be an agent’s subagent? Or
is this recursivity equivalent to the song “I’m My Own Grandpaw”? LONZO AND OSCAR, I’m
My Own Grandpaw, on THE VERY BEST OF (Vintage Masters Inc. 2012) (1947). A separate set
of dual agency issues exists with respect to document custodians and bailees in securitizations.
There is not an explicit “merger” doctrine in agency law providing that recursive
agency arrangements can be disregarded, but it is not hard to imagine a court adopting such a
principle. Similar merger doctrines exist in other areas of law. For example, when a party is both
an owner and mortgagee on a property, the law treats it solely as an owner. See, e.g., 31 C.J.S.
Estates § 153 (2008) (“Whenever a greater and a less estate coincide and meet in one and the
same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately merged in the greater, and
thus annihilated.”).
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(not to mention perhaps the most extreme case of stretching
corporate formalities), resulting in enormous problems on the back
end for collections, a cost borne by the buy-side, not the sell-side.
B. Revised UCC Articles 1 and 9
Since 2001, an additional method of transferring notes and
mortgages has been available, known only to a handful of cognoscenti
within the securitization industry. Articles 1 and 9 of the UCC were
revised in 2001 and now operate to provide a mechanism for a sale of
promissory notes and mortgages with no more formalities than an
enforceable written sale contract.
Lawyers typically think of UCC Article 9 as providing “a
comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in
210
personal property and fixtures.” Article 9, however, also governs
some types of sales. This is because the definition of “security
interest,” which appears in Article 1, includes not only liens—
contingent transfers of ownership—but also certain sales—outright
211
transfers of ownership.
In 1998, the American Law Institute and Uniform Law
Commissioners approved a model version of a major revision of UCC
212
Articles 1 and 9. Every state except for South Carolina adopted the
Article 1 revision, whereas all fifty states adopted the Article 9
revision. The Article 9 revisions were effective in most states as of
213
July 1, 2001, and in all states by January 1, 2002. One of the goals of
the revision was to “bring the commercial law setting for
214
securitization into the twenty-first century” or, as a history of the

210. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2001).
211. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2011). UCC Article 9 has always covered sales of chattel paper
but required filing for perfection. See id. §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-310(a).
212. Harry C. Sigman & Edwin E. Smith, Revised U.C.C. Article 9’s Transition Rules:
Insuring a Soft Landing—Part II, 55 BUS. LAW. 1763, 1763 n.1 (2000).
213. See U.C.C. § 9-701. For example, Article 9 went into effect in Connecticut on October
1, 2001, and in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi on January 1, 2002. Rod Clement, The
Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC and Mississippi Law: Changes to Individual
Names, Registered Organizations and Trusts, MISS. BUS. LAW. REP., Fall 2011, at 4, 10 n.3,
available at https://msbar.org/media/268261/Business%20Law%20Reporter%20Fall%202011.
pdf.
214. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 947 (1999).
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revisions describes the process, it was about “Making Revised Article
215
9 Safe for Securitizations.”
As revised, Article 1 defines a “security interest” to include the
interest of a buyer of a promissory note: “‘[s]ecurity interest’ means
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation. ‘Security interest’ includes any interest
of . . . a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a
216
promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.”
Revised Article 9 now also defines a “debtor” to include “a seller
217
of . . . promissory notes,” a “secured party” to include “a person to
218
which . . . promissory notes have been sold,” and “collateral” to
219
include “promissory notes that have been sold.” Thus, in this new
commercial cant, a debtor means a seller; a secured party means a
buyer; collateral means promissory notes sold; a security interest is a
sale; and a security agreement is a sale contract.
The result of these definitions is that the mechanism for creating
an enforceable security interest is now also the mechanism for the
220
sale of promissory notes. Article 9 provides that
a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties
with respect to the collateral only if
(1) value has been given,
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral . . . and
(3) . . .
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that
provides a description of the collateral . . . [or]
(B) the collateral . . . is in the possession of the secured
221
party . . . pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement . . . .

On its face, this provision is about the enforceability of security
interests. Yet when read using the alternative definitions of “security
215. See Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History,
73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167 (1999).
216. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (emphasis added).
217. Id. § 9-102(28)(B).
218. Id. § 9-102(73)(D).
219. Id. § 9-102(12)(B).
220. South Carolina is an exception because it has not adopted the revised definition of
security interest in Article 1.
221. Id. § 9-203(b).
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interest,” “debtor,” “security agreement,” and “secured party,” the
provision also provides that
a sale is enforceable against the seller and third parties with respect
to the promissory note sold, only if
(1) value has been given,
(2) the seller has rights in the promissory note . . . and
(3) . . .
(A) the seller has signed a sale agreement that provides a
description of the promissory note . . . [or]
(B) the promissory note . . . is in the possession of the
buyer . . . pursuant to the seller’s sale contract.

Thus, through alternative definitions, the 2001 UCC revisions
transformed a provision regarding the creation of security interests
into a provision regarding the sale of promissory notes. All that
Article 9 requires is that the seller sell a note to the buyer for value
pursuant to a signed sale agreement with the notes covered being
indicated either by delivery to the buyer or through description in the
sale agreement. In other words, Article 9 merely requires an
enforceable sale contract that complies with the Statute of Frauds.
The UCC further provides that a “security interest”—here, a sale
of the note—“attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable
222
against the debtor with respect to the collateral.” This is important
because attachment is the term that triggers a separate UCC
provision specifying that a sale of a promissory note includes a sale of
any associated mortgage:
The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or
performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal
or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the
223
security interest, mortgage, or other lien.

Translated:
The enforceability of a sale of a right to payment or performance
secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real
property is also an enforceable sale of the security interest, mortgage
or other lien.

222. Id. § 9-203(a).
223. Id. § 9-203(g).
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In other words, UCC Article 9 codifies (but only for UCC Article 9
sales) the common-law doctrine that “the mortgage follows the
224
note.” Article 9 thus creates a system for transfer and title of both
promissory notes and mortgages.
The Article 9 sales provisions are drafted in an unusually
misleading way that makes it virtually a secret, private law, known
only to securitization-industry insiders. Article 9 creates a transfer
method for negotiable notes that parallels, but does not supplant,
Article 3, all without even labeling itself as a note transfer method.
Someone searching for the law governing either note or mortgage
transfers would be unlikely to discover the relevance of UCC
Article 9. Someone looking for the law of notes would turn to
Article 3, and one looking for the law of mortgages would turn to
real-property law, not Article 9.
If, by chance, this intrepid researcher found the Article 1
definition as the result of say, a word search of a state code for
“promissory note,” its effect would not be obvious. The researcher
would have to know that the UCC Article 1 definition of “security
interest” is what controls the scope of UCC Article 9 and would then
have to work through the other nonintuitive definitions in Article 9,
such as “debtor” meaning “seller.” Even then, the Article 9
“mortgage follows the note” provision is not obvious on its face. In
short, although public law, the promissory-note sale provisions of
UCC Articles 1 and 9 are drafted in a manner that has kept them in
the private preserve of a small cadre of securitization deal lawyers.
Beyond these cognoscenti, the Article 9 transfer method is all but
unknown. Foreclosure lawyers for both banks and consumers
remained unaware of the provision for nearly a decade. Indeed, prior
to 2011 there was but one reported opinion that even referenced the
UCC Article 9 provision for sale of a promissory note, and to date
there have been fewer than a dozen opinions referencing the
provision, even though the securitization industry claims that both
225
Article 9 and Article 3 are used to transfer mortgage notes.
Why would UCC Article 9 be drafted so strangely? Why go
through linguistic contortions to seemingly reinvent what looks like a
simple sale contract subject to the Statute of Frauds?

224. See id. § 9-203 cmt. 9 (“Subsection (g) codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of
an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also
transfers the security interest or lien.”).
225. AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, supra note 106, at 3, 10, 15–16.
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The answer can be found in another part of Revised Article 9,
namely, the provisions dealing with “perfection” of security interests.
The rights of a secured party in collateral vis-à-vis competing
claimants, such as purchasers, creditors, or trustees in bankruptcy
(who have the rights of various hypothetical purchasers and
226
creditors ) are determined by the “priority” of their interests.
Senior-most priority creates freedom from claims.
The priority of a security interest is generally determined by the
227
earlier of the interest’s filing or perfection. Filing refers to the filing
of a financing statement listing the name of the debtor and the
secured party or its representative and describing the collateral in the
appropriate public recording office. The requirements for perfection
228
depend on the type of collateral, but for security interests in (that is,
the sales of) promissory notes, perfection is automatic upon
229
attachment. Perfection of the security interest in (that is, the sale of)
230
any mortgage associated with the note is also automatic.
All that is needed, then, for the sale of a promissory note and
associated mortgage to be insulated against competing claims is the
231
provision of value sufficient to support a simple contract, a signed
sale agreement, and either delivery or a sufficient description of the
232
note. A generic description (for example, “notes”) suffices. No

226. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012) (detailing the strong-arm powers of a trustee in
bankruptcy).
227. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1); see also id. § 9-317(a)(1) (“A security interest . . . is subordinate
to the rights of a person entitled to priority under Section 9-322 . . . .”).
228. Id. § 9-308(a).
229. Id. § 9-309(4). UCC section 9-312(a) permits perfection by filing for instruments, which
include promissory notes, whereas UCC section 9-313(a) provides that perfection in an
instrument may be achieved by taking possession of the instrument.
230. Id. § 9-308(e).
231. Compare id. § 1-204 (defining “value”), with U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (2001) (defining
“value” in the same manner).
232. The requirements for sufficiency of description are unclear. UCC section 9-108(a)
requires only that the description “reasonably identif[y] what is described,” and section 9-108(b)
provides that description by category, quantity, or collateral type is sufficient. U.C.C. §§ 9108(a)–(b) (2011). This requirement makes sense for a notice-filing system, but not when there
is automatic perfection on attachment. Thus, a security agreement that covers simply “mortgage
loans” would seem to qualify under section 9-108(a)–(b), but it provides no help whatsoever in
determining which mortgage loans were actually sold, especially if the seller engaged in other
similar sales. Nor is it clear how this provision interfaces with state law on real-estate transfers.
In title-theory states, the description of the notes might need to be sufficient to comply with the
formalities for the transfer of land because the mortgage transaction is understood as a sale and
repurchase of the land. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 2011).
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filing need actually be made in a public recording office. In other
233
Article 9
words, Article 9 has created “zipless” perfection.
perfection of a sale of a promissory note jettisons the long-standing
“paperization principle” for creating certainty in rights as an
234
unnecessary transaction cost. Thus, the revision of Article 9 is an
attempt to achieve the bright-line efficiency of a recordation-race
system without its formalities.
“Perfection” is a secured-financing term, not a sales term. Sales,
235
however, are not always clearly distinct from financings or leases.
Economically, a sale-and-repurchase agreement can look identical to
a secured loan or a finance lease agreement. One might distinguish
between a sale and a financing regarding the allocation of risk and
236
reward on the asset transferred. But often there is a less-thancomplete transfer of both risk and reward. For example, in a
nonrecourse loan, the debtor retains the upside potential on the
assets, while the creditor assumes the downside risk because the
debtor will default if the value of the collateral (to the debtor) is less
than the amount due on the loan. Similarly, both a sale-and-leaseback transaction and a sale-and-repurchase transaction (a “repo”) are
often economically equivalent to a nonrecourse secured loan. And
Notably, the UCC does provide that for certain types of transactions, including
“consumer transaction[s],” a description only by collateral type is insufficient. U.C.C. § 9-108(e).
The sale of consumer promissory notes and mortgages, however, is not a “consumer
transaction,” as defined by section 9-102(26). Although in practice securitization documents that
purport to effect sales under Article 9 are supposed to include schedules identifying the
collateral covered, the UCC does not appear to require such schedules, even though absent such
schedules, it is impossible to say when and if a particular promissory note and mortgage was in
fact sold under Article 9.
Moreover, even when schedules of notes and mortgages exist, they are not necessarily
integrated into the sales agreement, raising evidentiary issues. Unlike with a negotiable
instrument, there is no necessary integration of the sale agreement and its schedules, so
permitting generic descriptions enables latent ambiguity along the lines of the two ships in the
Peerless problem, see Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ct. of
Exch.), as we cannot be sure exactly which mortgage loans were sold and when, especially if
there were multiple sales.
233. Cf. ERICA JONG, FEAR OF FLYING 10 (1973).
234. See Clark, supra note 32, at 476–79.
235. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a) (“Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or
security interest is determined by the facts of each case.”); § id. 9-318 cmt. 2 (“Neither this
Article nor the definition of ‘security interest’ in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing
sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation.”).
236. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012) (defining “transfer” to include “the creation of a
lien” or “the retention of title as a security interest”); Meredith Jackson, Contracting out of
Article 9, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 281, 285–95 (2007) (discussing the factors that courts have used
to distinguish between sales, leases, and financings).
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even a simple sale with warranties shifts some risk back to the seller.
All of this means that there is some degree of uncertainty regarding
whether a particular transaction is a sale or a financing. No bright-line
rules exist.
Securitization tries to deal with this uncertainty through the use
of “true sale” and “nonconsolidation” opinion letters from counsel
attesting that if the transaction is done as described in the letter, then
237
courts “should” (or sometimes “would”) deem it a true sale. If the
transferor ends up in an insolvency proceeding and the lawyers are
wrong, then the transfer would be judicially recharacterized as a
238
secured financing. The question would then turn to whether the
financing was perfected. Prior to the 2001 Article 9 revisions, the
financing would not be perfected unless a financing statement had
239
been properly and timely filed. Prophylactic filing can be done to
protect against the contingency of judicial recharacterization, but it
adds expense and might not be done properly. If unperfected,
however, then the security interest could be avoided by a trustee in
bankruptcy or by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), leaving the trust with a general unsecured claim in the
240
insolvency proceeding. In other words, if recharacterized and
unperfected, the securitization trust (and thus investors) would not
have the freedom from competing claims on which they based their
241
economic bargain.
The Article 9 revisions were designed to protect against this
242
potential outcome. Under Revised Article 9, even if the transaction
were deemed a secured financing, rather than a sale, the secured
243
financing would be automatically perfected. Therefore, if a trustee
in bankruptcy or the FDIC were to challenge the sale transaction, the
worst outcome would be the demotion of the securitization trust from
237. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured
Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005) (discussing the function of securitization opinion letters).
238. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (“[T]his article applies to . . . a transaction, regardless of its form,
that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract . . . .”).
239. Donald J. Rapson, “Receivables” Financing Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 133, 137–38 (1999).
240. See 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS §§ 5.01, 5.06 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d
ed. Supp. 2007).
241. Id. § 3.04. Whether a transaction is in fact a sale or a security interest is not determined
by the UCC.
242. Id. § 5.02[G][2]; see U.C.C. § 9-318.
243. Perfection would also create a perfected security interest in proceeds of the notes.
U.C.C. §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2).
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a buyer to a secured creditor; its claim to the collateral would come
ahead of that of the trustee in bankruptcy or the FDIC, so freedom
from competing claims would be preserved. In other words, although
the sale-versus-security-interest question is still not decided by the
UCC, the distinction may not particularly matter for promissory
notes. By defining a “security interest” to include a “sale,” the UCC
created a legislative safety net for securitizations.
Article 9 creates freedom from claims without requiring the
formalities of negotiation or recording. Because of the Article 9
244
“mortgage follows the note” provision, transfers of mortgages that
previously would have involved the recording of assignments in land
records are now automatically perfected along with the perfection of
245
the note. By avoiding demonstrative formalities, Article 9 reduces
the transaction costs involved in securitizing mortgages. In short,
Article 9 created a securitization-friendly procedure that enabled
freedom from competing claims to be achieved through a simple sale
contract without requiring either formalities or filing. Significantly,
however, as we shall see, Article 9 has no provisions for the
246
enforcement of a promissory note. Thus, although Article 9
facilitated the transfer of mortgage notes, it reduced the certainty in
property rights in the notes needed for enforcement.
The expansion of UCC Article 9 to cover the transfer of
mortgage notes raises another problem: interaction with state realproperty law. No attempt was made to harmonize Article 9 with state
law on real-property conveyances. For example, a generic description
of mortgage notes by category (for example, “mortgage notes”) or
quantity (for example, “5000 mortgage loans”) would appear to
247
suffice under Article 9, but state real-property law is likely to
require a more specific description of property conveyed. Article 9
248
does not explicitly supersede other state law. Article 9’s interaction
244. Id. § 9-203(g).
245. Id. § 9-308(e).
246. Article 9 self-help repossession does not apply because, in Article 9 terms, the
collateral is the promissory note itself, not the real property. Id. § 9-609.
247. See supra note 232.
248. The Official Commentary to Article 9—not enacted as law in most states—is of two
minds. On the one hand, it sets forth that “an attempt to obtain or perfect a security interest in a
secured obligation by complying with non-Article 9 law, as by an assignment of record of a realproperty mortgage, would be ineffective,” thereby implying that Article 9 controls. U.C.C. § 9109 cmt. 7. On the other hand, the UCC itself provides that Article 9 “does not apply to the
extent that . . . another statute of this State expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority,
or enforcement of a security interest.” Id. § 9-109(c). Whether the term “security interest” here
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with state real-estate law is unclear, but it is hard to imagine that
when states adopted the Article 9 revisions that any member of a
state’s legislature thought that the revision was changing state realproperty-conveyance law.
Through its automatic perfection of mortgage assignments, the
2001 revision of UCC Article 9 purported to radically change realestate law as practiced by obviating the need to record mortgage
assignments to ensure perfection. The revision was done in such an
under-the-radar manner, however, that only the lawyers who helped
create securitization transactions—sell-side lawyers—were aware of
it. Not only does this raise troubling questions about the legitimacy of
the uniform lawmaking process, and the UCC Article 9 revisions in
249
particular,
but because the UCC revisions were done so

should be read to include a lien on real property is unclear. The Official Commentary states that
Article 9 “does not determine who has the power to release a mortgage of record.” Id. § 9-308
cmt. 6.
249. There is a large body of literature about the political economy of the uniform
lawmaking process. See generally, e.g., Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial Codification
as Negotiation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 17 (1998); Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC
Revision Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1996); Larry T. Garvin,
The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285 (1999);
Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REV. 1853 (1994);
Gail Hillebrand, What’s Wrong with the Uniform Law Process?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (2001);
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture and
the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998); Fred Miller, Realism Not Idealism in
Uniform Laws—Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707 (1998); A.
Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645 (1996); Kathleen Patchel,
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Iain Ramsay, Commentary, The
Politics of Commercial Law, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 565; Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for
the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of
Professor Rubin’s Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1994); Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency,
Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991); Edwin L.
Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH.
U. L. REV. 11 (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993);
Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons
from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251 (1989); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental
Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909
(1995); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 677
(2001); Robert E. Scott, The Mythology of Article 9, 79 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1995); Robert E.
Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About
Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436 (1997); David V. Snyder, Molecular Federalism
and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 419 (2007); David V.
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003).
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surreptitiously, they also leave unresolved questions about the
interaction with state real-property law.
C. Pooling and Servicing Agreements
We have now seen that there are two possible methods of
250
251
transferring notes and four methods for transferring mortgages.
The interaction between these different legal methods is not clear,
but just because multiple methods of transfer might be possible, it
does not follow that they are all implicated in actual transactions.
Which method is actually used in deals?
The key transactional document in a securitization is the Pooling
and Servicing Agreement (PSA). The PSA is usually a single
document that (1) creates the securitization trust; (2) transfers the
mortgage loans from the depositor to the trust (CD, per Figure 1);
(3) often also transfers the mortgage loans from the seller to the
depositor (BC); (4) serves as the trustee’s contract; (5) serves as the
loan servicer’s contract; and (6) provides for the issuance of the MBS.
PSA language varies, but almost all PSAs contain a section
dealing with “conveyance of mortgage loans” or the like. This section
contains two relevant transfer provisions. First, there is a recital of
transfer. For example:
Section 2.01. Conveyance of Mortgage Loans to Trustee. (a) The
Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery of this
Agreement, sells, transfers and assigns to the Trust without recourse
all its right, title and interest in and to . . . the Mortgage Loans
252
identified in the Mortgage Loan Schedule . . . .

This language basically tracks the requirements of an Article 9
sale. The PSA itself serves as the security agreement (the sale
document). If it is signed by the depositor (the seller of the loans, or
C) and contains an adequate description of the loans being sold
(found in the attached loan schedules), it will meet the requirements
for a sale of the promissory notes under Article 9, and the sale of the

250. These are Article 3 negotiation and Article 9 sale. There is potentially an additional
common-law sale method, arguably superseded by the codification of Article 9 sales, which
need not be of concern here.
251. These are Article 3 negotiation of the note combined with the common-law mortgagefollows-the-note doctrine, recordation of the assignment in land records, entry of a transfer in
the MERS database, and Article 9 sale of the note.
252. Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Bear Stearns Mortg. Funding Trust 2006-AR2,
§ 2.01 (Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d1zj61.vvh.c.htm.

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 5:55 PM

698

[Vol. 63:637

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

mortgages will accordingly happen automatically under the UCC
253
Article 9 “mortgage follows the note” provision.
Immediately following the recital of sale, however, PSAs have
language stating, “In connection with the transfer and assignment of
each Mortgage Loan” the depositor has “delivered” or “hereby
delivers” the original mortgage notes to the trust indorsed in a
particular manner. The indorsement requirement invokes a UCC
Article 3 transfer by negotiation. For example:
In connection with the transfer and assignment of each Mortgage
Loan, the Depositor has delivered or caused to be delivered to the
Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders the following
documents or instruments with respect to each Mortgage Loan so
assigned:
(i) the original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening
endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the
originator to the last endorsee, endorsed ‘Pay to the order of
_____________, without recourse’ and signed (which may be by
facsimile signature) in the name of the last endorsee by an
254
authorized officer.

Shaun Barnes, Kathleen Cully and Professor Steven Schwarcz, the
latter two of whom previously worked as sell-side securitization
attorneys, argue that the recital of sale is what accomplishes the
transfer and that the delivery instructions are not conditions to the
closing of the transaction, but merely provisions to protect the trust
255
and its investors. Therefore, in their view, noncompliance with the
indorsement and delivery requirements in PSAs does not defeat
256
transfers but instead creates a possible breach of contract.
This means that even if the indorsement and delivery did not
occur, the trust would still have standing to foreclose. It would also
have a breach-of-contract claim against the depositor, but that is not a
foreclosure issue. Yet if Barnes, Cully, and Schwarcz are correct, why
would PSAs even contain indorsement language? What work is this
language doing?

253. See U.C.C. § 9-203(g).
254. Pooling and Service Agreement, Sec. Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3,
§ 2.01(b) (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.z1Fa.d.htm#412u (bold
emphasis added).
255. Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s Role in
the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521, 529.
256. Id. at 529 n. 28.
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The answer might in part be path dependence. PSAs from post2001 are identical to those from pre-2001, which suggests that
Article 3 is really the transfer provision, as it has been all along.
Alternatively, the answer might be that post-2001, PSAs became a
belt-and-suspenders operation with both Article 3 and Article 9
transfer provisions. Article 9 was crafted to work without any change
in the deal documents, but risk-averse attorneys retained the Article 3
indorsement-and-delivery provision because of the uncertainty of
Revised Article 9 jurisprudence.
Yet there were also good business and legal reasons to continue
using Article 3 as the transfer mechanism. First, Article 9 transfers do
not create holders in due course. Only Article 3 negotiations can do
this. The resultant avoidance of assignee liability and freedom from
defenses are important benefits that MBS investors would have
wanted to retain.
Second, Article 9 says nothing regarding the enforcement of
notes. This suggests that for negotiable notes, at least, Article 3 still
controls. If so, then the trust cannot enforce the notes unless it is a
person entitled to enforce under Article 3, which, in most cases,
requires indorsement and delivery. Article 3, in other words, creates a
statutory standing requirement that Article 9 does not excuse.
Third, the requirement of indorsement and delivery is necessary
to ensure that the securitization trust takes the mortgage notes free
from competing claims. Article 9 provides that an Article 3 sale has
257
priority over an Article 9 security interest. It is not clear if this
provision is meant to apply only to true security interests and not
sales included under the Article 1 definition of security interest. The
provision largely tracks one in prerevision Article 9 that only covered
the contest between an Article 3 negotiation and a true security
258
interest.
Yet if we take seriously the Article 1 definition of “security
interest” to include a “sale” of promissory notes, then an Article 3
sale has priority over an Article 9 sale. Therefore, if a note is first sold
under Article 9 without delivery and then sold by the same seller
through an Article 3 negotiation to a party that becomes a holder in
due course, the subsequent Article 3 purchaser would actually take

257. See U.C.C. § 9-331(a) (granting priority to Article 3 holders in due course); id. § 9102(a)(47) (defining “instrument” as a “negotiable instrument or any other writing that
evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation”).
258. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1951).
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free of the Article 9 purchaser’s claim. The Article 9 purchaser
would have no rights in the note; at most, the purchaser would have a
litigation claim against the seller. Thus, the only way the MBS
investors could be completely sure that the securitization trust has no
competing claimants would have been to insist on Article 3 transfer.
Fourth, even if Article 3 sales do not trump Article 9 sales, there
would still be a logic for requiring Article 3 negotiation, namely, that
the Article 9 transfer method is too easy to consummate and hence
does not lend itself to easy proof, unlike Article 3. Under the basic
commercial-law rule of nemo dat, a transferor cannot transfer rights it
does not have; I cannot sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. For Article 3,
this is not a problem. Because of reification, the seller only has
something to transfer if the seller can deliver the physical note, and
260
the chain of title is built into the note itself through indorsements. If
there is no delivery, there is no transfer, so it is easy to verify if rights
have been transferred.
Article 9 codifies the nemo dat rule by requiring the seller to
261
have rights in the property sold for the transfer to be effective.
Unlike Article 3, however, determining if a seller has rights to
transfer is difficult. It ultimately requires proving up a chain of title
from the originator to the seller to the depositor or ABC. If this
chain cannot be proven, then the transfer from the depositor to the
trust (CD) is a manqué transaction.
The lack of solid evidence of transfers is particularly important
given the occurrence of “warehouse fraud,” wherein the same
mortgage might be sold multiple times to different buyers by the
262
same seller. If the originator A already sold the mortgage, then the
hapless subsequent buyer B has no rights in the mortgage to pass
along, making the BCD transfers meaningless; B, and therefore
C, have nothing to transfer.
259. See U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 2 (2011) (explaining that “priority” contextually means taking
“free” of the Article 9 security interest).
260. The 2002 revision to UCC section 3-309’s lost-note provision undermines reification by
enabling enforcement of notes that were lost in a mediate, rather immediate, transfer. As of
2012, only ten states have adopted this revised provision. See supra note 84.
261. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (requiring the seller to have rights in the collateral or the power to
transfer rights in the collateral).
262. See e.g., Provident Bank v. Cmty. Home Mortg. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Charles L. Armstrong, Thomas H. McNeill & James E. Reynolds, Warehouse
Lending Losses Under the Financial Institution Bond, 12 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 2 (2006); Brian F.
Corbett, Beware of Warehouse Lending Fraud, POYNER SPRUILL (Nov. 19, 2008),
http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/Pages/BewareofWarehouseLendingFraud.aspx.
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Using negotiation as the method of transfer shields against this
problem in all cases except those in which the borrower signed
263
duplicative original notes. If there is only one original negotiable
note, it can be transferred only once by any party through
indorsement and delivery, and the party that takes physical
possession with proper indorsement for value and in good faith will
be a holder in due course and free from competing claims, thereby
avoiding the warehouse-fraud problem.
Thus, there was a good business reason, at least from the
perspective of MBS investors, to want transfers to occur through
Article 3 negotiation rather than Article 9 contracts. That PSAs could
also qualify as Article 9 transfers added a cherry on top of zipless
automatic
perfection,
thereby
relieving
concerns
about
recharacterization of the transfers as unperfected secured loans which
would be vulnerable to avoidance by the FDIC or a trustee in
bankruptcy should the sponsor or depositor become insolvent. Article
9, then, it would seem, was never really meant to operate as the
transfer mechanism, but as a shield against the FDIC and bankruptcy
trustees.
Yet Barnes, Cully, and Schwarcz, the latter two of whom were
involved in structuring MBS, insist that Article 9 was the real transfer
method, and that Article 3 negotiation was optional. Failure to
264
properly negotiate the notes would create only a breach-of-contract
claim for the trust, but leave the trust with standing to foreclose on
the strength of the Article 9 transfer. And indeed, it appears from
reported decisions that the securitization industry’s own practices
were often to ignore indorsement and delivery requirements.
Frequently—although it is not clear how frequently—notes were not
indorsed at the supposed time of the transfer and indorsed, if at all,
265
only after litigation began. Moreover, the official Rule 30(b)(6)
263. 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 240, § 6.03[B][2].
264. There is a separate issue about whether a transfer by negotiation would be valid if it
complied with Article 3 but not with the particular indorsement sequence required in the PSA.
This issue, which involves questions of New York trust law and REMIC status, is beyond the
scope of this Article.
265. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602,
07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950,
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing
foreclosure actions for a lack of standing because the plaintiff-mortgagees did not have valid
assignments of the notes and mortgages at the time the complaint was filed); U.S. Bank v.
Coley, CV076001426, 2011 WL 2734603, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (dismissing
foreclosure for lack of standing because the mortgage assignment was four months subsequent
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deponent of Countrywide Financial, the largest mortgage lender in
the country during the housing bubble, testified in a bankruptcy case
that it was customary for the securitization sponsor to remain in
possession of the note and for indorsements to be prepared only
266
when necessary for litigating foreclosures. Postdefault indorsement
makes it impossible for the securitization trust to be a holder in due
267
course, so the Article 3 benefits of freedom from claim and freedom
from defenses are lost.
What, then, are we to make of this situation? On the one hand,
we have a situation in which MBS investors would have had good
reason to want Article 3 transfers and deal documents that seem to
require Article 3 transfers. On the other hand, however, we have
former securitization attorneys insisting that Article 9, rather than
Article 3, was the operative transfer mechanism and evidence that the
securitization industry frequently ignored the indorsement and
delivery requirements of Article 3 and the deal documents. To make
sense of this apparent tension, it is necessary to first ask why the titlesystem conflict was not resolved as part of the reforms undertaken to
facilitate securitization.
D. The Political Economy of Title Systems
The creation of MERS and the revision of UCC Articles 1 and 9
show that the securitization industry spent considerable effort and
political capital attempting to reshape the legal landscape in which

to the foreclosure suit’s initiation); McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d
170, 174–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for the
foreclosure plaintiff when the assignment of a mortgage occurred three days after the suit was
initiated and the assignment of the note was undated); Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ahearn, 875
N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing to
foreclose because the assignee did not own the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed);
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 WL 625560, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12,
2009) (affirming the dismissal of a foreclosure action for a lack of standing because the putative
mortgagee could not prove it owned the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed);
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Byrams, 275 P.3d 129, 132–33 (Okla. 2012) (reversing and
remanding summary judgment for the foreclosure plaintiff because standing did not exist at the
time the action was instituted); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1093 (Vt. 2011)
(upholding the denial of standing to foreclose because the bank could not demonstrate that it
was the holder of the note at the time the foreclosure action was initiated).
266. See Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 440 B.R. 624, 628 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010);
Transcript of Hearing at 15–17, Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (No. 08-18700), available at http://www.
americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/CountrywideDiMartini112910.pdf.
267. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2) (2011) (requiring a holder in due course to have taken
“without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored”).
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securitization operated. Why, then, was the title-system conflict not
resolved instead of muddied?
The answer might simply be that no one recognized the problem
and thought to fix it. The relative rarity of foreclosures prior to the
bursting of the housing bubble and the fact that they were typically
default judgments meant that no problem had really emerged in
practice. The prevalence of default judgments created a type of legal
“leverage” for the mortgage industry, much the way debt creates
financial leverage, enabling greater returns on equity. The assumption
of lack of foreclosure litigation was fundamental to the mortgage
industry’s business model. Indeed, the ability to obtain default
judgments in almost all debt-collection matters is essential to the
business models of consumer credit in general. When this assumption
failed in the aftermath of the housing bubble, the industry was ill268
equipped to deal with it.
The conceptual framework for UCC Article 3 also discouraged
recognition of conflicting title systems. UCC Article 3 speaks in terms
of enforcement rights, not ownership, so it is not generally thought of
as a title system (when it is thought of at all).
Part of the answer may also reflect the increasingly specialized
nature of legal practice: the attorneys who arrange securitizations are
not the same as those who do mortgage foreclosures. The former are
engaged in transactional work at large, white-shoe law firms; the
latter are litigators working as little more than debt collectors, far
269
down on the profession’s prestige ladder.
The securitization

268. By analogy, one might compare this situation to that of prosecutors’ offices and police
forces that are used to having almost all cases result in plea bargains and are therefore sloppy
with the tendering of exculpatory evidence or with the custody of evidence. This sort of
sloppiness is not a problem for the prosecutors as long as prosecutions result in plea bargains,
but when a crack defense team chooses to litigate, these bad habits can seriously complicate the
prosecution.
269. For a sense of just how different the nature of the legal practice is in the foreclosure
bar, the case of In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 655 F.3d 274 (3d Cir.
2011), is illustrative. In Taylor, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s reversal of a
bankruptcy court’s sanctions on a foreclosure law firm. In re Taylor, 655 F.3d 274, 288 (3d Cir.
2011). The law firm had no personal contact with or phone number for the client, or the ability
to communicate with the client about the case. Id. at 279. Instead, the firm received its work
orders via a computer system along with the supporting documents that the client deemed
necessary for prosecuting the foreclosure. Id. The law firm was required to file particular legal
documents on a preset time line or have its compensation docked. Id. Although it is not clear if
the lack of communication ability is unusual, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have state-by-state
foreclosure time lines that servicers (and hence servicers’ attorneys) must meet to avoid
financial penalties, and these time lines are often used as industry standards. See generally
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attorneys who contributed to the creation of MERS and Revised
Article 9 were focused on getting the securitization deals done and,
secondarily, achieving bankruptcy remoteness—freedom from claims.
Enforcement of the mortgages was someone else’s dirty, untoward
problem, especially as none of the myriad opinion letters involved in
securitization put the attorneys on the hook for enforceability issues
270
regarding the mortgages. In a nutshell, the development of MERS
and Revised Article 9 is captured by a Tom Lehrer couplet about
Wernher von Braun, the infamous rocket scientist: “‘Once the rockets
are up, who cares where they come down? That’s not my
271
department,’ says Wernher von Braun.”
Yet there is also a consistent political-economy story that
explains the developments of MERS and UCC Article 9. Different
property-rights verification regimes benefit different parties in
securitizations. The securitization industry has a myriad of different
players, but they can largely be characterized as sell-side and buy-side
institutions. Some institutions are active on both sides, but with little
272
apparent coordination. Securitization deals are assembled and sold
by the sell-side institutions, whereas the buy-side institutions are
fixed-income investors that generally treat MBS as one of many
potential investments.
MERS and UCC Article 9 were attempts to shift property-rights
verification regimes away from public, demonstrative regimes replete
with formalities toward simple, bilateral contractual allocation of
Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867 (2013) (describing the structure and
economics of foreclosure mills).
270. The opinion letters that accompany the SEC shelf registration for securitizations
typically note that the opinions expressed are based on the attorneys having “assumed . . . the
truth, accuracy and completeness of the information, representations and warranties contained
in the records, documents, instruments, and certificates [they] have reviewed.” Opinion Letter
from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP to Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., (Jan. 20,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099391/000106823806000048/
exhibit5-1.htm; see, e.g., Opinion Letter from Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP to Residential
Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., Re: Residential Mortgage Products, Inc. Registration Statement
on Form S-3 (Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099391/
000109939103000337/exh52.txt (“In rendering this opinion letter, . . . we . . . assume no
responsibility with respect to (a) the accuracy of and compliance by the parties thereto with the
representations, warranties and covenants as to factual matters contained in any
document . . . .”). Securitization opinion letters thus do not typically express any opinion about
the enforceability of the underlying mortgage loans; enforceability of the mortgages is an
assumption on which opinion letters are founded.
271. TOM LEHRER, Wernher von Braun, on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS (Reprise
Records 1965).
272. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 27, at 18–19.
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rights. Shifting from more formal to less formal and from more public
to less public verification regimes had the advantage of lowering
transaction costs for putting together securitizations. Lower
transaction costs benefitted sell-side institutions. Sell-side institutions’
revenue is largely fee based and thus depends not on deal
273
performance but on deal volume. Lower transaction costs enable
greater deal volume. Accordingly, “contracting” regimes for rights
verification were more attractive for the sell-side financial institutions
and their attorneys who assembled securitizations. The sell-side was
not concerned about fraud costs, uncertainty costs, and adjudication
274
costs—the costs reduced through the “paperization principle” —
because they are all borne by the buy-side.
MERS was a creation of and is owned by sell-side firms. The
Article 9 drafting process is harder to characterize, but the push to
make the world safe for securitization appears to have been a sellside, rather than buy-side, initiative; by definition the buy-side has
other investment options, so it is not focused on facilitating
securitization.
From the buy-side’s perspective, a critical feature of what makes
MBS attractive is the apparent security of property rights in the
underlying mortgages—freedom from claims and freedom from
defenses. Buy-side institutions bear the risk of any problem in
mortgage title, most notably the risk of the securitized assets getting
pulled into the bankruptcy estate of the transferor, the risk of being
subject to two levels of taxation because the mortgages are treated as
property of the transferor, rather than the pass-through securitization
275
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMIC) vehicle, and
the risk that standing cannot be proven for enforcement purposes.
Accordingly, from a buy-side perspective there is a strong interest in
ensuring absolute certainty in the property rights transferred. All of
this militates toward the buy-side preferring public demonstration
regimes like Article 3 and land records because they lend themselves
to easier verification of rights than bilateral contracting regimes.
In a transparent, well-functioning market, MBS buyers would
have demanded a discount for the use of the contracting regime and

273. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 151, at 1230.
274. See Clark, supra note 32, at 476 (“By requiring a writing between the parties to a
transaction, unfixity [i.e. uncertainty] costs are significantly reduced. Fraud costs ought also to
be reduced, in that fraud by one of the parties on the other is made somewhat more difficult.”).
275. See supra note 146.
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its heightened risk for both bankruptcy remoteness and enforcement
276
of mortgages. But this would have required MBS investors to see
the problem and anticipate its impact.
Accordingly, we might hypothesize a lulling story: Investors need
to feel sufficiently confident about the rights they are receiving if they
are to be induced to buy MBS. The MBS market was established
using negotiation and land-record recording. Although expensive,
these methods of transfer established a high degree of certainty about
freedom from claim and ability to enforce. Once the market was
established in the 1990s, however, MBS investors stopped being
concerned with the technical details of transfers, relying on rating
agencies—compensated by the sell-side—to flag any problematic
legal changes via ratings. Just as the rating agencies failed to flag
problems in the mortgage underwriting, they also failed to flag
problems in the legal structure, which enabled the sell-side to shift to
less formal and less expensive systems like MERS and UCC Article 9
that benefitted them, not the MBS investors. The cost-shifting
implications became apparent to investors only after the bubble burst
and foreclosures became difficult to prosecute because of standing
problems.
Even now, it is impossible for MBS investors to gauge the impact
of the regime shift. MBS investors receive very little information
about deal performance. They receive monthly reports from MBS
trustees that detail delinquency rates and realized losses but not the
factors involved in the losses. Therefore, absent further investigation,
it is impossible for MBS investors to determine whether losses are
caused by poor underwriting, property value declines, or delayed or
prevented foreclosures due to inability to prove standing.
The representations and warranties that accompany most
securitized loans can reasonably be read to warrant the enforceability
of the mortgage and the completeness and appropriateness of the
277
documentation.
Enforcement of these representations and

276. It is not clear how much, if any, of the transaction-cost savings were captured by
homeowners.
277. Common representations and warranties include a representation and warrant from the
seller to the depositor, master servicer, and trustee that “[i]mmediately prior to the
assignment[,] . . . [the seller] had good title to, and was the sole owner of, [the loan] free and
clear of any pledge, lien, encumbrance or security interest and had full right and authority . . . to
sell and assign the [loan] pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.” Pooling and
Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, supra note 203, sched. III-B(1). Other
typical seller representations and warranties to the depositor, master servicer, and trustee are
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warranties, however, depends upon MBS trustees and servicers. This
is a problem because neither trustees nor servicers are looking out for
MBS investors. MBS trustees do not represent the investors’ interests
in any meaningful way.
MBS trustees are a distinct type of trustee. They are not donative
278
but like
trustees. They are not (usually) indenture trustees,
indenture trustees, their duties are primarily contractually defined
rather than springing from a fiduciary penumbra. MBS trustees are
compensated only for ministerial functions; they are typically paid
less than a basis point annually on the outstanding principal balance
279
of the mortgage loans held by the trust. MBS trustees are not
required to undertake anything more than their normal ministerial
280
functions unless an expressly defined event of default has occurred.
When an event of default occurs, however, the trustee is held to a
281
prudent-person standard of care. As a result, the trustee may have
to assume additional duties. Additionally, if prudence or a requisite
that “[e]ach Mortgage is a valid and enforceable first lien on the Mortgaged Property,” and that
“[t]here is no valid offset, defense or counterclaim to any Mortgage Note or Mortgage, including
the obligation of the Mortgagor to pay the unpaid principal of or interest on such Mortgage
Note.” Id. sched. III-A(4), (6).
The depositor makes more limited representations and warranties, namely that “[t]he
Depositor hereby represents and warrants to the Trustee with respect to each [loan] . . . that as
of the Closing Date, and following the transfer of the [loans] to it by each Seller, the Depositor
had good title to the [loans] and the Mortgage Notes were subject to no offsets, defenses or
counterclaims.” Id. § 2.04.
278. Some MBS are issued pursuant to indentures, and, even when not, MBS trustees may
still be subject to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–bbbb (2012), and state
trust indenture laws, but unlike a classic bond indenture trustee, an MBS trustee does hold title
to an actual trust corpus and typically has different duties than an indenture trustee, such as
ensuring that the required mortgage loan documentation has been delivered to the trust,
protecting the trust corpus, supervising the servicer of the loans, and acting as a financial
backstop to the servicer.
279. See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, supra
note 203, Article I (“Trustee Fee: As to any Distribution Date, an amount equal to one-twelfth
of the Trustee Fee Rate multiplied by the sum of (i) the Pool Stated Principal Balance plus (ii)
any amounts remaining in the Supplemental Loan Account (excluding any investment earnings
thereon) with respect to such Distribution Date.”); id. (“Trustee Fee Rate: With respect to each
Mortgage Loan, 0.009% per annum.”).
280. See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, supra
note 203, § 8.01 (“The Trustee, prior to the occurrence of an Event of Default and after the
curing of all Events of Default that may have occurred, shall undertake to perform such duties
and only such duties as are specifically set forth in this Agreement.”).
281. See, e.g., id. (“In case an Event of Default has occurred and remains uncured, the
Trustee shall exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it by this Agreement, and use the
same degree of care and skill in their exercise as a prudent person would exercise or use under
the circumstances in the conduct of such person’s own affairs.”).
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majority of investors requires the termination of the servicer (often
called the “master servicer”), then the trustee is typically required to
282
assume the duties of the servicer. The trustee thus serves as a
backup servicer, placing it in a potentially costly guarantor role
should the servicer fail to fulfill its duties and be terminated.
MBS trustees have three major adverse incentives to being
proactive and investigating losses. First, trustees risk being held to a
higher standard of care (and possibly losing their indemnification
283
from the servicer ) if they are proactive prior to an expressly defined
event of default. Second, a trustee’s diligence may result in an event
of default and the trustee being subject to a prudent-person standard
of care and greater duties (including potentially the assumption of the
servicer’s duties). And third, trustees do not want to jeopardize their
business relationships with sell-side firms because trustees receive
their business from from sell-side firms affiliated with servicers rather
284
than from MBS investors. These sell-side firms face representation
and warranty liability to the trust on the quality and enforceability of
the loans sold, and the servicers themselves face servicing covenant
liability if they fail to enforce these representations and warranties.
As a result, MBS trustees are willfully blind to representation and
warranty problems, including those relating to mortgage loan
documentation, lest they notice that servicers are not providing notice

282. See, e.g., id. §§ 7.01–7.02 (“If an Event of Default . . . shall occur, then, and in each and
every such case, so long as such Event of Default shall not have been remedied, the Trustee
may, or [if directed by a group of Certificate Holders with two thirds of the voting rights in the
trust] shall . . . terminate all of the rights and obligations of the Master Servicer under this
Agreement and . . . all authority and power of the Master Servicer hereunder, whether with
respect to the Mortgage Loans or otherwise, shall pass to and be vested in the Trustee. . . . On
and after the time the Master Servicer receives a notice of termination . . . the Trustee shall . . .
be the successor to the Master Servicer in its capacity as master servicer under this Agreement
and the transactions set forth or provided for herein and shall be subject to all the
responsibilities, duties and liabilities relating thereto placed on the Master Servicer by the terms
and provisions hereof and applicable law including the obligation to make Advances . . . .”).
283. See, e.g., id. § 8.05 (“The Trustee and any director, officer, employee or agent of the
Trustee shall be indemnified by the Master Servicer and held harmless against any loss, liability
or expense (including reasonable attorney’s fees) (i) incurred in connection with any claim or
legal action relating to (a) this Agreement, (b) the Certificates or (c) in connection with the
performance of any of the Trustee’s duties hereunder, other than any loss, liability or expense
incurred by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith or negligence in the performance of any of
the Trustee’s duties hereunder or incurred by reason of any action of the Trustee taken at the
direction of the Certificateholders . . . .”).
284. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 199, at 58–63.
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of breaches of representations and warranties and are violating their
285
servicing covenants, which could be the basis for an event of default.
Securitization investors face significant obstacles to forcing
trustees to fulfill their obligations. Investors in securitizations
typically have the right to enforce the duties of the servicer or the
representations and warranties of the sponsor through a demand on
the trustee to act. Such a demand, however, typically requires
compliance with a collective-action clause that mandates that it be
supported by 25 percent of the voting rights of the MBS certificates,
sometimes in each class of certificates. The trustee controls the list of
the certificate holders who are otherwise anonymous to each other,
unless the requisite number of certificate holders gather to demand
the list from the trustee. The certificate holders must also offer the
trustee indemnity for its actions taken in response to their direction.
Only if the trustee refuses to act for sixty days following notice and
indemnity may a certificate holder bring suit itself to enforce the
securitization contract, and even then, the certificate holder cannot
easily remove the recalcitrant trustee: the trustee is usually removable
only upon the action of certificate holders representing 51 percent of
the voting rights of the certificates. Securitization trustees are usually
do-nothing entities that are not inclined to look out for MBS
investors. Accordingly, they are unlikely to take any action to
determine why losses are occurring on mortgages.
MBS servicers, in contrast, may very well know why losses are
occurring. MBS servicers are loath to enforce representations and
warranties because they are frequently affiliates of the sell-side
286
firms. Servicers do not want to force their affiliates to pay out on
representations and warranties, particularly because MBS include
liquidated damages clauses for breaches of representations and
warranties that require the sponsor to repurchase the loan from the
trust for its remaining balance, rather than for the diminution in the

285. See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual
and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1063–64 (2002) (noting the trustee’s lack of
incentives to function as an “effective representative” for the bondholders); Steven L. Schwarcz
& Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV.
1037, 1042–43 (2008) (advocating that the business judgment rule for corporate directors should
be superimposed over the indenture trustee’s prudent-man standard to correct deficiencies in
the current system); Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, 54
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 707, 708–09 (2009) (discussing the dilemma faced by trustees who represent
groups of investors that have conflicting interests).
286. See supra note 162.

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 5:55 PM

710

[Vol. 63:637

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
287

Accordingly, even though MBS investors
value of the loan.
purchased mortgages that were represented and warranted to be
properly documented and enforceable, they have little recourse when
servicers are unable to foreclose because the investors cannot prove
standing due to documentation problems. The investors lack
information on individual loans and cannot easily obtain it, much less
force trustees and servicers to act. Doing so requires the investors
typically holding 25 percent of the voting rights in a securitization
deal to notify the trustee of an event of default and indemnify the
trustee before the trustee undertakes any actions in response to an
investor demand. The former requirement is a problem because
investors do not know the identity of each other; most MBS do not
have publicly available bondholder lists, so achieving the threshold to
288
make a collective demand on the trustee can be difficult. Investors
then need to have sufficient facts to credibly allege an event of
default—but investors generally lack this information. Moreover, the
indemnification can then be costly, and, because of credit tranching,
many investors may not especially care about representations and
warranty violations in any particular deal because the losses are borne
by other investors in lower-priority tranches.
Investor action has resulted in what is proposed to be the largest
private settlement in history, an $8.5 billion proposed settlement
between the Bank of New York Mellon as trustee for some 530 MBS
trusts and Bank of America, covering, among other things, loan
289
documentation issues. Yet it was difficult for investors to even get
Bank of New York Mellon to act once they alleged an event of
default, and Bank of New York Mellon still never performed a
substantive investigation of any of the documentation problems
290
alleged, but merely settled them. The private-label securitization

287. The liquidated damages clauses are known as “putback” provisions because a loan that
fails to conform with the seller’s representations and warranties is put back to the sponsor.
Technically the putback is “enforced” by the trustee after receiving notice from the servicer,
seller, depositor, or itself of the breach of representation or warranty, but the servicer’s notice is
the key to the action. Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB,
supra note 203, § 2.03(c).
288. Some PSAs entitle groups of investors (but not single investors) to obtain information
about the identity of other investors. E.g., id. § 5.05 (requiring trustee to provide the most recent
certificateholders list in response to a petition by at least three certificateholders).
289. See Verified Petition at 1, In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 651786/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 28, 2011), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1.
290. Full disclosure: I am retained as an expert witness on behalf of American International
Group (AIG) as an intervenor opposing court approval of the proposed settlement. Although
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market turns out to have been a lemons market not just on mortgage
291
underwriting but also on legal transfer regime.
Today, the more sophisticated buy-side firms understand that the
enforcement problem exists, even if they do not fully understand why.
This is one reason why the private-label securitization market
remains moribund. After the bubble, investors are understandably
concerned about the probability of default on securitized mortgages.
They also cannot estimate loss-given-default because of legal
uncertainty. Accordingly, they are staying away from any deals in
292
which they bear credit risk because it cannot be priced. The only
securitization that is now occurring is with the federal government
bearing all credit risk. The collapse of the securitization market is
exactly what Professor George Akerlof’s model of the lemons market
predicts, and as long as it remains a lemons market, including for legal
transfer regime, private-label securitization will not be resurrected.
IV. THE REFORM OF MORTGAGE TITLE SYSTEMS
A. Existing Reform Proposals
The existence of a problem in the enforcement of mortgages has
been widely recognized by scholars as well as practitioners. None of
the scholarly treatments of the issue, however, has recognized the
enforcement difficulties as being driven by a problem of conflicting
title systems. Though some of the scholarship has recognized that
293
there is a tension between the UCC and real-property systems, none
has identified this as the core problem.

UCC issues have not been specifically raised in the proposed settlement, it does cover some
issues related to the documentation of notes and security interests to the securitization trusts.
See Exhibit B at 34, In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 651786/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2011),
NYSCEF Doc. No. 3. Loans registered on MERS are excluded from coverage in this provision
of the settlement. Id. at 29.
291. See generally Akerlof, supra note 148 (hypothesizing lemons markets).
292. Adam J. Levitin, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, The Dodd-Frank Act and
Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J.
ON REG. 155, 157–58 (2012).
293. See, e.g., Whitman & Milner, supra note 19, at 60 (“[I]n a number of nonjudicialforeclosure states, the requirements of UCC Article 3 and the corresponding statutory
foreclosure procedures seem to exist in different universes.”); John Patrick Hunt, Richard
Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Rebalancing Public and Private in the Law of Mortgage Transfer 29
(UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 327, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117555 (“Article 9 [of the UCC] and real property recording law may
be in conflict, at least in some states.”).
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Instead, the existing scholarship tends to focus on either the
mortgages or the notes, but not on their interaction. Thus, proposals
294
have been made to reform land recordation systems, require record295
of-ownership requirements to foreclosure statutes, fix MERS so
296
297
298
that it tracks or holds notes, create a national lien registry,
299
eliminate negotiability, or merge the note and mortgage into a
300
single document.
1. Reformation of Land Recordation Systems. All of these
proposals have shortcomings, but their fundamental problem is that
they diagnose the problem with mortgage title too narrowly. Land
recordation systems could stand to be modernized, but their
antiquated features are not the cause of the problems relating to
foreclosure. Similarly, requiring records of mortgage ownership
would help clarify standing for nonjudicial foreclosures, but by itself it
does not resolve how ownership records are to be established.
2. Reformation of MERS. A reformation of MERS so that it
would either definitively track or hold notes would bring it closer in
line with the DTC model of immobilized title for both notes and
301
302
mortgages. MERS, however, previously rejected holding notes,

294. See Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording
System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 19–21 (2011) (“An ideal system will deal with the
fundamental problem with the American land title system. It is a paper-based system that has
been awkwardly translated to computers.”); Hunt et al., supra note 293 (proposing upgrading
local recording systems to handle electronic mortgage assignments).
295. See Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why
Procedural Requirements Are Necessary To Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 1719, 1740–41 (2011).
296. See Robert Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage
Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 373, 406 (2013) (suggesting “reform of the current mortgage and
note recording system, ideally in the form of a readily accessible and editable electronic registry
system—e.g., a fully generalized MERS system”); Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own
Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 551, 600–09 (2011).
297. Whitman, supra note 49, at 757–66.
298. Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 293.
299. Whitman, supra note 49, at 769.
300. White, supra note 168, at 498.
301. Such a reformation could also involve a nationalization of MERS; private recording
databases will inevitably suffer from questions of credibility and reliability to the extent they are
relied upon for judicial evidence. See Langin, supra note 20, at 7–8 (discussing a case in which
testimony and evidence regarding the global debt-registry process was admitted by a court to
establish chain of title to a debt). Unlike recording systems for consumer debt, DTC and other
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which would vastly increase its duties and liabilities. More
importantly, there is a stronger public interest in clarity and
transparency of mortgage title than for securities; holding mortgages
in “street name” can cause many greater problems than doing so for
securities. And given the current state of the law on MERS, a
statutory framework equivalent to UCC Article 8 would be necessary
for a revamped MERS to operate.
3. Creation of a National Lien Registry. A national lien registry,
especially one operated by the government, rather than by a private
party like MERS, is a sensible idea, but a lien registry alone is
insufficient to solve the standing problem, and raises other operative
and legal questions. Although there are problems with the accuracy
of MERS’s database, the fundamental problem is a question of which
title system controls. A national lien registry could work if the right to
foreclose were determined by lien registration; that would have the
effect of essentially choosing mortgage recordation in a public system
as controlling over other title systems. This is a sensible approach, but
it would require major law revision and would face a politicaleconomy problem of shifting recording revenue from local
governments to the federal government. There is also a question
about whether there is constitutional authority for the federal
government to interfere with real-estate recordation, which is
traditionally a local right.
Federal housing-finance reform legislation proposed in 2013
contemplates creating a privately operated national registry for
303
consensual mortgage liens. The logic to a national mortgage title
system is that it would match the national housing-finance market.
book-entry systems for investment securities are not frequently used to provide evidence in
judicial proceedings.
302. See generally R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life on MERS, PROB. & PROP., July–Aug.
1997, at 33 (describing the decisions involved in the creation of MERS).
303. Such a registry has been proposed in two housing-finance-system reform bills pending
in Congress: the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 2767,
113th Cong. §§ 331–335 (2013), and the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act
of 2013, S. 1217, 113th Cong. §§ 224–225 (2013) (the “Corker-Warner bill”). Although as a
generic matter a national lien registry makes some sense, I have criticized these legislative
proposals on account of their motivation and their inadequate consideration of the complexities
of making a national system fit with local real-property law. See A Legislative Proposal To
Protect American Taxpayers and Homeowners by Creating a Sustainable Housing Finance
System: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 113th Cong. 3–4 (2013) (statement of
Professor Adam J. Levitin), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg113-ba00-wstate-alevitin-20130718.pdf.
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There are several problems, however, with the idea as proposed in
the legislation.
First, clarity of real-property title is a public good and should be
provided by the government, rather than by private parties, as is
already done by the federal government for other types of property,
such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, broadcast spectrum, aircraft,
and some nautical vessels.
Second, it is not clear how the national system would interact
with local land records. Currently, a variety of types of property
interests are recorded in local land records, including deeds,
consensual liens, and involuntary liens. The fact that all of these
interests are recorded in one system enables the law to easily
prescribe priority among them and for someone investigating title to
have a relatively simple search. The MERS system, for all of its flaws,
does not fundamentally reject this common system, as MERS is
inserted in the local land records as a type of a bookmark. Thus, if
there were a MERS mortgage, it would show up in the local land
records and give a title searcher notice of an encumbrance. The
searcher would have to then look in the MERS database to determine
the identity of the parties with an interest in that mortgage. At that
point problems might ensue, but it would be clear to the title searcher
that there was some sort of voluntary encumbrance on the property
that needed to be further investigated.
This process would not work with a separate national mortgage
registry. The national system would contain recordations of a subset
of voluntary liens—those granted to institutional lenders. Other
voluntary liens, all involuntary liens such as tax liens, homeownerassociation liens, construction liens, and judgment liens, and all other
property interests would remain in the local land records. Creating
two parallel systems would raise a host of thorny questions about how
304
the systems would interact. Which law would control, federal or
state? And how would the property interests in the two systems be
reconciled? How would priority of interests be determined? How
would legal requirements from title-theory states apply to mortgages
in a federal system? Absent serious work reconciling fifty state realproperty systems with a federal registry, local land records would
cease to provide definitive sources of clear title but would also
304. Neither the Supremacy Clause nor federal-preemption doctrine provide much guidance
because there is not a conflict between federal and state law, so much as a question about the
priorities of the mortgages recorded under these laws.
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continue to exist and be relevant for determining title. The result
would undermine the very goal of a national system, as it would only
add a title system, rather than consolidate existing ones.
A simpler solution to lack of consistency of mortgage title
procedures among the states would be to recreate a federally owned
and operated MERS-type system that would sit as a superstructure on
local land records. Such a system would easily interface with existing
land records, local real-property law, and lien-priority rules. Further,
with any federal MERS system, it would be simple to correct the
major failings of the MERS system: failure to properly and timely
register transfers could have definite legal effects, thereby ensuring
the accuracy of the database; foreclosures could be required to be
undertaken in the name of the real party in interest; and transfers
within the database could only be made by properly registered and
vetted agents of lenders, rather than by MERS’s poorly supervised
and much-criticized system of “signing agents,” none of whom
305
actually work for MERS.
A farther-reaching approach would involve the federalization of
all land records in a Torrens-type registry, such as that used in several
306
states and other countries. This approach would make sense if
designing a land record system on a blank slate, but it would be an
expensive undertaking with questionable constitutional authority.
4. Elimination of Negotiability. Elimination of negotiability
raises a range of potential problems. It would expose mortgage
307
investors to the risk of double selling (warehouse fraud), thereby
undermining the freedom from claims that is a basic assumption for
most MBS investment. Indeed, warehouse lending, which provides
the financing for most mortgage banks, relies on negotiability: many
warehouse-lending arrangements involve a bailment of mortgage
notes with the bailee (such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) having the
option to purchase the notes. This option can be easily executed if the
notes held by the bailee are indorsed in blank. The ambiguous nature
of title to a bailment of bearer property is precisely what lubricates
the system.
Eliminating negotiability would also eliminate the possibility of a
mortgagee being a holder in due course, again affecting freedom from
305. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 118.
307. Whitman, supra note 49, at 768–69.
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claims and freedom from defenses. Although assignee liability might
308
not be a bad thing, elimination of negotiability also makes
enforcement more difficult—the terms of a mortgage would need to
be proven separately from the note. In any event, the market could
abandon negotiability by itself if the benefits outweigh the costs. Yet
the market has cleaved to what it believes to be a negotiable
instrument for the note.
5. Merger of Note and Mortgage. The idea behind merging the
note and mortgage into a single instrument is to eliminate the
possibility of the noteholder being different from the mortgagee. By
itself, however, all merger accomplishes is to make the mortgagefollows-the-note doctrine literal. It does not resolve how the
instrument is supposed to be transferred and therefore who has
enforcement rights. Moreover, a merged instrument would present
privacy problems for borrowers. Not all individuals want their
neighbors to know that they have bad credit and can only get a
subprime loan. The current separation of the note and mortgage
means that only the mortgage is a public document. The terms of the
note stay private, protecting the borrower’s (and the lender’s) privacy
interest in the terms of the loan, which may reveal the borrower’s
overall financial condition. Merger of note and mortgage into a single
instrument would come at the expense of borrower privacy absent
some way of splitting the recorded instrument into a public portion
and a portion available only to litigants and the recording-office
officials.
***
Ultimately, the deficiencies of existing reform proposals all stem
from the overly narrow nature of their diagnoses of the problem as
309
310
either one of real-estate recordation systems, negotiability, or
311
consumer protection. The mortgage-title-system problem implicates
all of these issues, but it is fundamentally a problem about competing
title systems. Once the nature of the problem is recognized, a

308. See Kurt Eggert, Not Dead Yet: The Surprising Survival of Negotiability, 66 ARK. L.
REV. 145, 171–73 (2013) (identifying the holder-in-due-course doctrine as the real problem with
negotiability).
309. See Marsh, supra note 294, at 19–24; Zacks, supra note 296, at 551–55.
310. See Whitman, supra note 49, at 741–54.
311. See White, supra note 300, at 494–96.
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solution—reconciling
title
systems—readily
presents
itself.
Importantly, however, system reconciliation would only help
prospectively; it would not solve the legacy problem of existing
mortgages.
B. Reconciling Title Systems
There are several possible ways to reconcile mortgage title
systems. As an initial matter, however, it is important to note that the
standard property-law move for dealing with competing claims,
namely, establishing a system of priorities, is inapplicable to a
problem of competing systems used to establish rights against
nonclaimants. The issue is one of system validity, not priority.
Were one creating a mortgage title system from scratch, it is
likely that such a system would be integrated with land records. It
would also be a federal-level system; only historical development
explains why state and local law still shape a national (and
international) real-estate finance market. There also would be no
particular reason for having mortgage title separate from other types
of security interests. In short, if working on a blank slate, a unified
federal system for recording of a range of intangible and tangible
property interests might make sense; realistically, however, any
reforms must work within the existing institutional framework of
county-level land records and state-level law.
Working within the existing institutional framework, the simplest
approach would be to pick a system and have it be the sole
determinative system. Thus, we could decide that Article 3
negotiation, Article 9 sale, MERS, or land records control. If the
concern is establishing clarity of property rights, then public
recordation—land records—would seem to be the optimal system
because it gives the best evidentiary certainty, and because virtually
312
all mortgages are recorded as a matter of practice. But mortgage
recordation is not mandatory, and the mortgage is an ancillary right
to the note—a mortgage without a note has little meaning. State realproperty law would need to be amended in some cases to make such a
system work well.
Alternatively, we could create a hierarchy among existing title
systems, in which all would be valid ways of creating title, but title in

312. One could envision a grace period for transferring mortgages recorded in MERS’s
name to the name of the real economic lender.
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one system would trump title in another system if there were a
conflict. For example, we could have a system in which Article 9 sales
trump MERS, negotiation trumps Article 9 sales, and mortgage
recordation trumps negotiation. Thus, if there were a conflict
between, say, Article 9 and recordation, the recorded title would be
treated as controlling. There is a potential recursivity problem here as
long as recordation can be done in MERS’s name. To wit, in the
example above, if recordation trumps Article 9, but the mortgage is
recorded in MERS’s name, then what has really happened is that
MERS has trumped Article 9, which upends the intended hierarchy.
But conceptually, the idea of establishing a hierarchy is another way
to deal with competing property-title regimes.
A further approach would be to return to presecuritization
systems, which worked well in terms of keeping title clear. This could
be done via a partial repeal of the UCC Article 1 and 9 revisions and
a prohibition of property recordation in the name of agents, thereby
making MERS inoperable. This approach would require recordation
of every mortgage transfer in a securitization, as well as cumbersome
indorsement and delivery of thousands of notes, but these
demonstrative formalities would be the price tag for clear property
rights.
Another approach would be that adopted by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Eaton, namely, requiring that note and
313
mortgage systems match as a prerequisite for foreclosure. A party
would need to prove that it was both the owner (or holder) of the
note and the mortgagee in order to foreclose. Although such an
approach clarifies foreclosure standing issues, it does not clarify the
ownership of notes or mortgages, which is important for mortgage
financing markets.
An alternative approach would be to create a county- or statelevel system for registering ownership of mortgage notes that would
be linked to land records through unique identifiers. A note registry
314
would not establish conclusive title to the note. But it would provide
strong presumptive evidence of title, much like mortgage recordation.
It could also establish priority of claims to notes, thereby avoiding
warehouse-fraud problems. Note registration could then be combined
with the Massachusetts approach by making matching registration of
313. For discussion of Eaton, see supra notes 10, 16 and accompanying text.
314. One could imagine a Torrens registration system for notes, cf. supra note 118, but it
would add significant costs.
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the note and recordation of the mortgage prerequisites for
foreclosure. The result would be reduced fraud costs, uncertainty
315
costs, and adjudication costs. Moreover, a note registration system
would not require the recording of the actual notes, as registration
would not be evidence of the terms of the notes, only of ownership of
the note. A note registry need only be a grantor-grantee index and
could be adopted by local governments at comparatively low cost
given their existing mortgage recordation systems. This means that
registration could preserve borrowers’ privacy interest in the terms of
the note.
Note registration and a requirement of matching notes and
mortgages for foreclosure would solve the problem of which title
system controls while leaving undisturbed the operation of either land
records or UCC Article 3 or Article 9. Registration would be required
only for mortgage notes and only as a prerequisite to foreclosure.
UCC Articles 3 and 9 would still operate as before for nonmortgage
notes, whereas mortgage notes would simply require an additional
formality for foreclosure, which could also be used as a type of notice
filing to achieve extra security for those lending against the security of
mortgage notes. Similarly, a note registry does not interfere with the
operation of the current land recordation system, which enables
prospective lenders to engage in tract searches to find out if there are
any existing encumbrances on the property.
Adopting a note registration system is the most natural outcome
of the increased transfers of mortgage loans. Registration systems are
frequently used for other types of readily traded debt instruments
because of concerns such as problems of lost or forged instruments,
the costs of physical delivery and indorsement, and interest in
reducing litigation by clarifying rights. Treasury securities are tracked
in a central registry maintained by the Federal Reserve Banks known
316
as a “book-entry” system. Fannie and Freddie MBS are also issued
317
using a book-entry system. Some cross-border trades of goods use

315. See Clark, supra note 32, at 478 (discussing the benefits of recordation).
316. See Book-Entry Procedure, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/
aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed05.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (noting the difficulties in making
actual physical deliveries of securities and that “[s]ecurities in book-entry form are less
vulnerable to theft and loss, can’t be counterfeited and don’t require counting or recording by
certificate number”).
317. Id.
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318

the Bill Of Lading Electronic Registry Organization (BOLERO).
And most corporate and municipal debt and equity securities utilize
319
the DTC.
MERS represented another type of registration system for debt
instruments, albeit one that was poorly designed and executed.
MERS’s legitimacy suffered because of the errors in its database and
abuse of corporate formalities. But the concern with MERS is also
acute because the public policy interest in land title is different than
the public policy interest in securities, and yet MERS lacks a statutory
framework comparable to the UCC Article 8 and SEC regulation
framework in which the DTC operates. Clouded property title affects
neighboring properties and household balance sheets in a way that
ownership of securities or bills of lading do not.
The technical work of creating a note registry that interfaces with
land records should not be a particularly onerous undertaking. The
expense of operating such a system should be fairly modest, and much
of the work could be automated. Although the system would be built
around bright-line rules permitting foreclosure only to registered note
owners-mortgagees, some standards-based safeguards need to be
built to provide flexibility to the system, particularly to deal with
320
problems of mistake or abuse.
A note registration system could obviously process mortgage
notes executed after the registry’s operational date. Legacy mortgage
notes—those executed before the registry’s operational date—would
present a challenge, however. Registration of existing mortgage notes
would be expensive and would upset parties’ settled expectations
about cost frameworks in mortgage lending. There would also be the
question of how to prove ownership of mortgage notes that have
already been transferred. Although optimally all legacy mortgage
notes would be registered, a more feasible and fairer solution would
be to permit, but not require, registration for legacy notes. Legacytitle problems will have to be resolved slowly and messily, as courts

318. See generally Miriam Goldby, Electronic Bills of Lading and Central Registries: What Is
Holding Back Progress?, 17 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 125 (2008) (noting that central registry
systems like BOLERO have not been widely adopted because of membership requirements,
confidentiality concerns, and liability for system malfunction).
319. Responding to Wall Street’s Paperwork Crisis, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/about/
history (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
320. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1369, 1420–35 (2013).
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experiment with ways of upholding the law while limiting the systemic
effects.
Ultimately, the key question with a mortgage note registry is
whether it is worthwhile. The costs and benefits are hard to
immediately quantify in dollar terms. On the one hand, the costs are
operation costs of creating and maintaining a registry and the cost to
mortgagees of registering the notes. For local governments that
already operate mortgage recordation systems, the costs of creating
and operating a parallel note registration system seem fairly low—
registration is not a particularly complex task. Requiring matching
registration and recordation as a prerequisite to foreclosure would
increase the costs of mortgage lending, and those costs might get
passed on to mortgage borrowers in part or in whole.
Against these costs we must weigh the benefits. Registration
benefits the homeowner in the event of a foreclosure by ensuring that
procedural rights will be respected. Requiring matching registration
and recordation is in essence a form of mandatory insurance for
321
borrowers.
321. In theory, private title insurance would serve as a solution to questions about mortgage
title. If mortgage title is in doubt, private title insurers will assume the risk in exchange for an
acceptable premium, and, if risks become too great, then title insurers simply will not insure. In
practice, however, private title insurance is incapable of dealing with the mortgage chain-of-title
problem. This is because private title insurers have already written numerous policies on
properties in which title may not be clean. The title insurers’ business model anticipates only
unique, one-off insurable events. See Joyce D. Palomar, Bank Control of Title Insurance
Companies: Perils to the Public That Bank Regulators Have Ignored, 44 SW. L.J. 905, 928–29
(1990) (explaining why an attorney or abstractor is only expected to exercise reasonable care in
conducting a title search, and may not be held liable for failing to detect a title defect that would
be undetectable by a reasonable search); David E. Woolley & Linda D. Herzog, MERS: The
Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365,
393–94 (2012) (discussing scenarios presenting unique problems to title insurance). Accordingly,
they are simply not capitalized to be able to handle a systemic title problem. See JOYCE
PALOMAR, Limits on Size of Single Risks Assumed, in 2 TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 18:34 (2012),
available at Westlaw TITLEINSL (examining statutory limits on liability that title insurance
underwriters may assume, as well as related exceptions to that rule); Suzanne M. Garcia, A
Glance at the Impact of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis on the Title Insurance Industry, 30 PACE
L. REV. 233, 235–41 (2009) (discussing the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on title
insurance companies); Quintin Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 502 (1957) (noting
the small or nonexistent reserves maintained by most title insurers). If such a problem exists,
title insurers are functionally insolvent and have nothing to lose by continuing to write new
policies. Indeed, even if there were a systemic title problem, title insurers would have to
continue writing new policies in order to continue operating because they are usually paid in
single, up-front premiums, so if they cease writing new policies, their cashflow, and hence their
ability to operate, will cease. See H. Lee Roussel & Moses K. Rosenberg, The High Price of
“Reform”: Title Insurance Rates and the Benefits of Rating Bureaus, 48 J. RISK & INS. 638, 642–
43 (1981) (noting that title insurance, unlike other types of insurance, depends on a single
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Registration also benefits the courts by preserving their
jurisdictional integrity and creating adjudicative efficiency.
Foreclosure is a severe remedy that invokes the coercive power of the
state to deprive a resident of his or her home—a property interest
that receives particular solicitude in the law. This is precisely the sort
of circumstance in which there is a societal interest in ensuring that
the coercive machinery of state is used appropriately, which
necessitates adopting a more reliable source for verifying property
rights.
There are also positive externalities on society at large from
clarity of title that registration helps capture. Clarity of title enables
greater alienability of realty, including of neighboring realty. Absence
of title clarity conversely creates negative social externalities.
Registration would help create the positive externalities and avoid
the negative ones.
Registration could also lower the cost of mortgage lending.
Warehouse lenders would have to do less diligence, resulting in cost
savings in the financing system that might benefit borrowers. More
importantly, registration could ultimately reduce foreclosure costs by
reducing uncertainty in the legal system and reducing litigation costs.
Lower foreclosure costs might result in lower mortgage rates and
322
greater credit availability.
The cost-benefit tradeoff from mandating note registration as a
prerequisite to foreclosure is not quantifiable and is ultimately
uncertain, as are its distributional impacts. Yet there is a plausible
case that it would create a more efficient mortgage financing system
from a Kaldor-Hicks, if not a Pareto, perspective, which is sufficient
given the ability of parties in the mortgage finance system to
reallocate costs among themselves. Even if registration did not create
a more efficient system, however, the distributional adjustments and
jurisdictional integrity benefits might themselves be sufficient to
make the system appealing. Indeed, we already impose similarly
mandated procedural insurance through existing foreclosure

purchase to raise revenue); Peter Soskin, Protecting Title in Continental Europe and The United
States—Restriction of a Market, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 411, 425–33 (2011) (examining the history
and characteristics of title insurance policies). Therefore, unless title insurers constantly
underwrite new policies, they have no ongoing source of revenue. This means that private title
insurers cannot be relied on to either bear the costs for or screen against systemic problems in
title.
322. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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procedures and the existence of the bankruptcy system. Mandating
this type of procedural insurance reflects the societal interest in
324
ensuring clarity in real-property rights.
Note registration is not the only possible way to reconcile
competing mortgage title systems, but it would create the greatest
certainty-of-rights benefits relative to its invasiveness. Adopting a
registration-based, property-rights verification regime to govern
mortgage notes and linking it to a public recording system for
mortgages might also ultimately result not only in greater certainty of
mortgage title, but also in more efficient mortgage lending, and even
if not, may protect against potentially severe negative public
externalities.
CONCLUSION
The problem of mortgage title stands as a lesson to the
commercial-law community of getting away from the fundamentals of
commercial law. This is not simply a doctrinal point, although part of
this story told here is a perversion of doctrine in the service of a
particular interest group. Nor is it even a point about the need to see
the entire forest of commercial law instead of an atomized view that
can quickly lead to conflicts within commercial law. Instead, it is
about the fundamental purpose of commercial law, which is to
facilitate transactions between parties by providing a legal framework
for the transfer of property, be it goods or payment rights.
The standard move in the commercial-law playbook for
transaction facilitation is Coasean: reduce transaction costs. Yet this
move overlooks the importance of ownership and title in commercial
law, perhaps, in part, because the UCC generally eschews these
terms. Commercial-law semantics aside, however, parties’ bargains
are based on what is being transferred. Even if all other transaction
costs are eliminated, parties will not transact if they do not know what
it is they are buying or selling. Reduction of transaction costs is
ultimately a second-order move for commercial law. The first-order
move, so elemental it is easy to forget, is clarification of the property

323. See generally Joshua Goodman & Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of
Credit: The Impact of Cramdown on Mortgage Interest Rates (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Working
Paper No. RWP12-037, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128841.
324. Note that the argument for mandatory “insurance” here is not because of adverse
selection but because of externalities.

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 5:55 PM

724

[Vol. 63:637

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
325

being transferred. There are certainly moves in this direction within
326
commercial law, such as implied warranties of merchantability.
Property law too moves in this direction through the numerus clausus
327
principle. Ultimately it is a property-law lesson that commercial law
needs to internalize, namely, that certainty of property rights is a
328
precondition for investment. In a viable commercial-law system, the
reduction of transaction costs cannot come at the expense of certainty
of property rights.
The mortgage title system also presents a particularly vexing
version of the too-big-to-fail problem. The legal questions raised by
foreclosure standing litigation were not ones that were unanswered
historically, but the answers were ones that were inconvenient for the
housing-finance industry and ones that the industry chose to
disregard. Normally, parties disregard the law at their own peril, but
the calculus is different for a too-big-to-fail industry like housing
finance. When a too-big-to-fail industry disregards the law on a wide
scale, courts are faced with the choice of upholding the law and
causing economic chaos or ignoring the law for the sake of economic
stability.
Typically too-big-to-fail crises have economic or natural-disaster
triggers, such as a slowing of expected housing price increases or a
tsunami. They are not typically triggered by court decisions. Yet with
mortgage title problems, courts are put in the position of being
themselves the potential trigger for a too-big-to-fail crisis. In a case
like mortgage title, in which there is seldom any question about the
“right” result on the merits—the homeowner has defaulted on the
mortgage—courts may be inclined to ignore the law and opt for
economic stability. Doing so, however, ignores that procedural
protections are part of the economic bargain of the mortgage loan,
and also deprives a particularly vulnerable population of the
procedural rights that are intended to protect them.

325. UCC Article 2, for example, will tolerate an open price term, an open delivery date, an
open payment date, open delivery terms, and quantity terms based on outputs or requirements,
U.C.C. §§ 2-304 to -310 (2011), but it does require agreement on what is being sold, see id. § 2204.
326. Id. § 2-314.
327. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 9–11 (2000) (explaining that both
civil and common-law courts treat classes of previously recognized property as modifiable only
by the legislature).
328. See supra note 26.

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 5:55 PM

THE PAPER CHASE

725

The mortgage-title-system problem could, like all too-big-to-fail
legal problems, be solved by enforcing the law and then letting the
political system address the results. Courts, however, might shy from
economically disruptive rulings, particularly if they have doubts about
the ability of the political system to fix the ensuing chaos. This might
well be the case in the aftermath of the bailouts of 2008–2009 and the
federal debt-ceiling crises in 2011 and 2013. The mishandling of one
round of crisis creates consequences for the next; bailouts are not
329
single-stage games.
Courts’ behavior should not surprise legal realists. Courts are
ruling with one eye on the economic consequences and accordingly
are finding ways to preserve legal principles without triggering crises.
The mortgage title issue’s complex and arcane nature makes it
especially easy to find ways to dispose of cases without issuing
definitive rulings about which system of title-and-transfer controls,
and it is easy to ignore compliance problems as isolated exceptions,
rather than the rule. Moreover, because the subject of the litigation is
standing, it is possible to dismiss cases without prejudice, theoretically
enabling mortgagees to get their paperwork in order and restart the
330
dismissed foreclosures. Other courts have been more explicit about
what they are doing. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for
example, heeded the pleas of the real-estate bar about the risk to
clouded title if past foreclosures were subject to its ruling in Eaton
and accordingly made its ruling prospective only, a sharp departure
331
from its usual practice. One way or another, cautious courts are
likely to muddle through the legacy problems of existing mortgages.
Cautious muddling might be the best we can hope for in a bad
situation, yet it is not clear that this is how we should want our court
system to operate. The potential perversion of the law to
accommodate too-big-to-fail industries, rather than the risk of
financial bailouts, is perhaps the most threatening part of the too-bigto-fail phenomenon because of its corrosive institutional effect. Toobig-to-fail can hold all branches of government hostage.
Ultimately, the confusion over how mortgages are transferred
represents a breakdown of our commercial-law and real-estate-law
system. The mortgage title disaster represents “the greatest failure of

329. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 447 (2011).
330. E.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ohio
2012); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596, 601–02 (Okla. 2012).
331. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1120–32 (Mass. 2012).
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lawyering in the last 50 years.” The law reforms pushed by the
securitization industry in the name of efficiency undermined the legal
foundation for a critical part of the economy. Going forward,
rebuilding the U.S. housing-finance system must begin by reinforcing
its legal infrastructure.

332. Gretchen Morgenson, A Tornado Warning, Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at
BU1 (quoting U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain).

LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 5:55 PM

THE PAPER CHASE

727

APPENDIX
This Appendix is meant to provide an illustrative range of
foreclosure-standing cases as of June 2013, rather than a complete
listing of all such cases. It is organized by the state law being applied.
Alabama
• Congress v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 98 So. 3d 1165 (Ala. Civ. App.
2012) (holding that a mortgagor could prevail in a wrongfulforeclosure action by showing lack of standing to foreclose if it
could prove on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that
the allonge to the mortgage note was fabricated, and
remanding for trial on that basis)
Arizona
• In re Tarantola, 4:09-bk-09703-EWH, 2010 WL 3022038
(Bankr. D. Ariz. July 29, 2010) (denying a motion for relief
from stay for lack of real interest in the property when the
plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of the note)
• Varbel v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0263,
2013 WL 817290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale did not require the production of
the note or its chain of custody)
California
• In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 765 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding that the noteholder plaintiff must join the owner of
the note, the real party in interest, before it could seek relief
from a stay), rev’d, 438 B.R. 661 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
• In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (denying a
motion for relief from a stay for lack of real interest in the
property when the plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of
the note)
• In re Urdahl, No. 07-07227-PB7, 2008 WL 8013408 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. June 9, 2008) (denying a motion for relief from stay
for lack of real interest in the property when the plaintiff could
not prove valid assignment of the note)
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Connecticut
• U.S. Bank v. Coley, No. CV076001426, 2011 WL 2734603
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (dismissing a foreclosure for
lack of standing because the mortgage assignment was four
months subsequent to the foreclosure suit’s initiation)
Florida
• In re Canellas, 6:09-bk-12240-ABB, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) (finding no evidence of a proper
assignment of the mortgage or the note to the foreclosing party
prior to foreclosure)
• McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing a grant of summary
judgment for a foreclosure plaintiff when the assignment of a
mortgage occurred three days after the suit was initiated and
the assignment of the note was undated)
Idaho
• In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (denying a
motion for relief from stay for lack of real interest in the
property when the plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of
the note)
• In re Sheridan, 08-20381-TLM, 2009 WL 631355 (Bankr. D.
Idaho Mar. 12, 2009) (same)
Kansas
• U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. McConnell, 305 P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App.
2013) (holding that the formal assignment of the mortgage
after the commencement of the foreclosure action did not
vitiate standing because the mortgage follows the note)
Massachusetts
• In re Jones, 07-15662-JNF, 2008 WL 4539486 (Bankr. D. Mass.
Oct. 3, 2008) (holding a putative mortagee lacked standing
because the mortagee did not provide proof of valid
assignment of the mortgage)
• In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (same).
• Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 286 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. In re Nosek,
406 B.R. 434 (D. Mass. 2009) (sanctioning the attorneys for the
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putative mortgagees when the attorneys had claimed to be the
holders of the mortgages and notes but had actually sold them
five days after origination)
In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding no
evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage or the note to
the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure)
In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding
no evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage to the
foreclosing party prior to foreclosure and no evidence that the
note was assigned)
Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012)
(holding that a foreclosure sale was invalid because the
foreclosing entity did not hold the promissory note at the time
of sale)
Bevilacqua v. Rodrigues, 460 Mass. 762 (Mass. 2011) (holding
that an invalid foreclosure sale was ineffective to transfer title)
U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (Mass. 2011)
(holding that a foreclosure sale was invalid because the
foreclosing entity was not the mortgagee of record at the time
of sale)

Michigan
• Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a foreclosure must be vacated
when the bank “did not yet own the indebtedness that it sought
to foreclose”)
• Residential Funding Co, L.L.C. v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909
(Mich. 2011) (holding that MERS had standing to foreclose
nonjudicially)
Nevada
• Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Medina, No. 2:09-CV00670-KJD-GWF, 2009 WL 4823387 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2009)
(finding no evidence that the plaintiff was the agent of the
owner of the note and therefore was not a real party in interest
with standing)
• Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Chong, Nos. 2:09-CV00661-KJD-LRL, BK-S-07-16645-LBR, 2009 WL 6524286 (D.
Nev. Dec. 4, 2009) (same)
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• Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011)
(holding that nonjudicial foreclosures could not proceed under
the Nevada foreclosure-mediation statue when a party seeking
foreclosure was neither the holder of the note nor the assignee
beneficiary of the deed of trust)
• Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275 (Nev.
2011) (same)
• Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 2012)
(holding that the party seeking to foreclose must demonstrate
that it was both the holder of the promissory note and the
beneficiary of the deed of trust)
New Jersey
• In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (sustaining an
objection to a proof of claim when the plaintiff could not prove
an enforceable right to the note under state law)
New York
• In re Minbatiwalla, 424 B.R. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing a
mortgagee’s claim without prejudice for failure to provide
documentation establishing the mortgagee’s proof of claim
upon a debtor’s objection)
• Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2011)
(“[F]oreclosure of a mortgage cannot be pursued by one who
has no demonstrated right to the debt.”)
• Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc. v. Gress, 888 N.Y.S.2d 914
(App. Div. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked
standing to foreclose because it did not own the mortgage at
the time the complaint was filed)
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App.
Div. 2009) (finding no evidence of a proper assignment of the
mortgage to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure)
• Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ahearn, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 595 (App.
Div. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing
to foreclose because it did not own the mortgage at the time
the complaint was filed)
• JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Butler, 2013 WL
3359283 (Sup. Ct. July 5, 2013) (releasing the proceeds from a
home sale to the defendant-mortgagor because the plaintiff
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bank never owned the note and mortgage and therefore never
had a right to foreclose)
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, No. 31648/2009, 2013 WL
1831799 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (denying a motion for summary
judgment in a foreclosure because the assignment of the note
and mortgage were void when they did not comply with the
PSA)
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Stevens, 911 N.Y.S.2d 691
(Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked
standing to foreclose because the assignee did not hold the
promissory note at the time the complaint was filed)
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. George, 910 N.Y.S.2d 762
(Sup. Ct. 2010) (same)
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d 720
(Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding no evidence of a proper assignment of
the note to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure)
Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Randolph Bowling,
906 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s
assignee lacked standing to foreclose because the assignee did
not hold the promissory note at the time the complaint was
filed )
HSBC Bank U.S.A. Nat’l Ass’n v. Miller, 889 N.Y.S.2d 430
(Sup. Ct. 2009) (same)
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Abbate, 901 N.Y.S.2d 905
(Sup. Ct. 2009) (same)
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin, 873 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup.
Ct. 2008) (dismissing a foreclosure action without prejudice
due to discrepancies in affidavits as to the date of the
assignment of the mortgage and failure to provide an affidavit
from someone with a valid power of attorney regarding the
assignment)
Countrywide Home Loans v. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup.
Ct. 2007) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing
to foreclose because it did not own the mortgage at the time
the complaint was filed)

Ohio
• Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Snyder, No. 3:07CV480, 2008 WL
4560794 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2008) (dismissing a foreclosure
action without prejudice for lack of standing because there was
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no evidence that the mortgage had been transferred from
MERS to the foreclosing entity)
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2008) (ordering a plaintiff to produce
evidence that the plaintiff owned the note and mortgage when
the complaint was filed before summary judgment could be
granted)
In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 07-cv-166, 07-cv-190, 07-cv-226,
07-cv-279, 07-cv-423, 07-cv-534, 07-cv-536, 07-cv-642, 07-cv-706,
07-cv-727, 07-cv-731, 07-cv-963, 07-cv-1047, 07-cv-1119, 07-cv1150, 2007 WL 4589765 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2007) (dismissing
foreclosure actions for lack of standing because the plaintiffmortgagees did not have valid assignments of the notes and
mortgages at the time the complaint was filed)
In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532,
07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681,
07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950,
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31,
2007) (same)
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d
1214 (Ohio 2012) (reversing a foreclosure judgment because
the foreclosing party received the promissory note and
mortgage after the commencement of foreclosure and
therefore lacked standing, which could not be corrected by
subsequent transfers of the note and mortgage)
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 984 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012) (holding that a bank had standing to foreclose despite
not being the mortgagee at the time of foreclosure because it
333
held the bearer paper note)
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Duvall, No. 94714, 2010 WL 5550257
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2010) (holding that a mortgagee’s
assignee lacked standing to foreclose because the assignee did
not own the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed and
was therefore not the real party in interest)
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perry, No. 94757, 2010 WL 5238626
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010) (overturning summary judgment
because the plaintiff’s affidavit did not state that the plaintiff

333. The court did not address why holding a note gives standing to foreclose the
homeowner’s equity of redemption via a forced sale, rather than simply standing to sue for
monetary damages.
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owned both the note and the mortgage at the time the
complaint was filed and a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to foreclose)
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 WL 625560
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009) (affirming a dismissal of a
foreclosure action for lack of standing because the putative
mortgagee could not prove that mortgagee owned the
mortgage at the time the complaint was filed)
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008) (same)
Oklahoma
• U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596 (Okla. 2012)
(reversing a foreclosure judgment for lack of standing because
the plaintiff was not the holder of the note and therefore not a
person entitled to enforce the note)
• Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Byrams, 275 P.3d 129 (Okla.
2012) (reversing and remanding summary judgment for a
foreclosure plaintiff because standing did not exist at the time
the action was instituted)
• Deutsche Bank v. Brumbaugh, 270 P.3d 151 (Okla. 2012)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment to a foreclosure
plaintiff because material issues of fact remained regarding
standing to foreclose)
Oregon
• Niday v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157 (Or. Ct. App.
2012) (holding that a deed-of-trust beneficiary that used MERS
could not undertake a nonjudicial foreclosure)
Vermont
• U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087 (Vt. 2011)
(upholding a denial of standing to foreclose because the bank
could not demonstrate that it was the holder of the note at the
time the foreclosure action was initiated)
Washington
• In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009)
(holding that a servicer for a holder of a note, which had no
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beneficial interest in the note, was not the real party of interest
and thus was not entitled to relief from stay)
• Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012)
(holding that MERS could not utilize the Washington
nonjudicial foreclosure procedure because it was not the lawful
beneficiary of a deed of trust because it did not hold the note)

